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I. 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended) confers 
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court or other appellate Courts, as 
provided by statute, to review all final agency actions resulting 
1 
from formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (1953, as amended) and Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure grant jurisdiction to the Utah Court of 
Appeals to review the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of State agencies. This appeal 
is from a formal adjudicative proceeding conducted by the Career 
Service Review Board, a statutorily created and state funded 
administrative agency. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Does the Department of Corrections have a duty to 
implement and enforce the policies issued by the Department of 
Human Resource Management (herein State Personnel)? 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of general law and is to 
be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the agency's 
decision. SEMECO Indus.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 
1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting). 
2. Does the Department of Corrections have a duty to treat 
its employees, including Petitioner Morgan, with consistency and 
fairness such that inequitable and unjust circumstances do not 
arise regarding the pay levels of departmental employees? 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of general law and is to 
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be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the agency's 
decision. Id. 
3. Did the Career Service Review Board err in holding that 
the Department of Corrections had treated Petitioner Morgan 
fairly and justly regarding her pay despite the fact that 
Petitioner Morgan proved that a newly hired employee (with less 
combined directly-related education and experience) was paid a 
higher salary than Petitioner Morgan? 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of an abuse of discretion 
and is to reviewed on an intermediate standard of whether it is 
reasonable and rational. Id. 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the case 
on appeal and each of the following are set forth in the text of 
Argument hereinafter (pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure): 
a. Utah Code Annotated 67-19-2(2). 
b. Utah Code Annotated 67-19-2(3). 
c. Utah Code Annotated 67-19-2(6). 
d. Utah Code Annotated 67-19-5. 
e. Utah Code Annotated 67-19-6(1)(i). 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. CASE NATURE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION 
This is a grievance filed by a career service employee of 
the State of Utah. Petitioner Morgan filed her grievance in July 
of 1990, asserting an injustice involving her wages and salary. 
The grievance was denied at all levels of internal review by the 
Department of Corrections. 
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Petitioner Morgan then appeared before a duly appointed 
Hearing Officer, Garth L. Mangum. Mr. Mangum noted the disparity 
between Petitioner Morgan's pay and that of Scott Pepper but 
concluded that a $0.47 per hour difference was not sufficient to 
warrant a change in Petitioner's salary. Petitioner appealed to 
the Career Service Review Board (herein CSRB), which affirmed on 
the ground that Petitioner had not carried her burden of proving 
a pay inequity. 
Petitioner appeals from the decision of the Step 5 Hearing 
Officer and the Career Service Review Board denying her 
grievance. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All citations are to the Findings of Fact (F.F.) rendered by 
the Career Service Review Board in the Step 6 Decision. A copy 
of that Decision is set forth in the Addendum. 
Sherry Morgan has been an employee of the State of Utah for 
over twenty (20) years. F.F. 18. Prior to working for the 
Department of Corrections, she worked in what was then known as 
the Department of Social Services for just over seven (7) years. 
Id. When Sherry filed her grievance in this matter, she was 
employed with the Department of Corrections as an Adult Probation 
& Parole agent. At the time of the grievance, she had worked 
with the Department as an Adult Probation & Parole agent for 
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thirteen (13) years and ten (10) months, and was occupying a 
Grade 23 position and being paid at the rate of $13.34 per hour. 
F.F. 21, 22. She earned a Bachelor of Science degree in 
Sociology prior to becoming employed with the Department. F.F. 
18. Sherry therefore claims to have seventeen (17) years ten 
(10) months combined education and experience. 
Sherry's principal grievance is that her circumstances 
(i.e., education and experience) warrant that she should be 
treated like a similarly situated employee. That employee's name 
is Scott Pepper. Mr. Pepper was hired in 1989 as a Grade 23 
Adult Probation & Parole agent. F.F. 38. At the time of the 
grievance, Mr. Pepper had seventeen (17) years of related 
experience but no related educational background. F.F. 39. Mr. 
Pepper was being paid at the rate of $13.81 per hour at the time 
of the grievance. F.F. 38. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I; Public policy requires fair and consistent 
treatment of all state employees. To achieve that end, State 
Personnel is required to administer the pay plan so that state 
agencies comply with the Utah State Personnel Management Act 
(herein USPM Act) and State Personnel rules and policies. State 
Personnel has adopted administrative rules mandating that state 
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agencies comply with State Personnel rule and policies. State 
agencies are therefore bound to comply with the USPM Act and 
State Personnel rules and policies. 
POINT II: By requiring state agencies to treat employees 
fairly and consistently, the Legislature intended that state 
employees had the right to challenge any injustice or oppression 
involving his/her wages and salary. In broad statutory language, 
the Legislature granted state employees the right to file 
grievances involving such injustices. Thus, the fact that State 
Personnel does not have an administrative rule directly on point 
does not preclude state employees from grieving injustices 
regarding their wages and salaries. Further, since State 
Personnel and the Career Service Review Board (herein CSRB) have 
recognized the concept of pay inequity, Petitioner Morgan can 
validly challenge an injustice regarding her salary on a theory 
of pay inequity. 
POINT III: Sherry Morgan has seventeen (17) years and ten 
(10) months of education and experience that is directly related 
to the position of Adult Probation & Parole Agent, Grade 23. 
That education and experience exceeds that of a co-worker, Scott 
Pepper, who had seventeen (17) years and zero (0) months of 
directly related experience. Since Mr. Pepper's pay exceeded 
that of Petitioner Morgan by $0.47 per hour, that pay 
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differential constitutes a pay inequity that should be remedied 
by this Court, 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS REQUIRED TO 
COMPLY WITH THE POLICIES ADOPTED BY STATE 
PERSONNEL. 
Public employees are charged with the obligation of 
performing their duties in an efficient and fair manner 
consistent with the public trust bestowed upon them. To that 
end, the Legislature recognized that public employees can best 
perform their duties if the employees are shielded from the 
vagaries of politics. The Legislature thus enacted the Utah 
State Personnel Management Act, U.C.A. 67-19-1, et seq., (1979, 
as amended) (herein USPM Act). The USPM Act contains seven (7) 
declarations of policy, of which three (3) declarations are 
pertinent to the case at bar: 
"(2) It is the policy of this state that the 
Utah state personnel system be administered 
on behalf of the governor by a strong central 
personnel agency. Any delegation of 
personnel functions should be according to 
standards and guidelines determined by the 
central personnel agency and should be 
carefully monitored by it. 
(3) It is the policy of this state that 
comparative merit or achievement govern the 
selection and advancement of employees in 
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Utah state government and that employees be 
rewarded for performance in a manner that 
will encourage excellence and strengthen the 
system. 
(6) It is the policy of this state to ensure 
its employees opportunities for satisfying 
careers and fair treatment based on the value 
of each employee's services." U.C.A. 67-19-2 
(1979, as amended). (Emphasis supplied). 
In order to implement the foregoing policies, the 
Legislature created a department, known as the Department of 
Human Resource Management (herein State Personnel), to administer 
and implement the USPM Act. See U.C.A. 67-19-5 (1979, as 
amended). The Legislature specified that State Personnel would 
be administered through a Director who is appointed by the 
Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. The 
Legislature also imposed numerous statutory duties upon the 
Director, which include, inter alia, the development of "a state-
wide program of personnel management that will; ... foster 
careers in public service for qualified employees; ..." U.C.A. 
67-19-6(1)(i). Finally, the Legislature intended for State 
Personnel to perform an oversight function as to state agencies 
in certain specified areas. Such an intent arises by virtue of 
the fact that certain functions of State Personnel are 
statutorily prohibited from being delegated to state agencies: 
"The following functions shall be performed 
by the department and may not be contracted 
or otherwise delegated to another state 
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agency: 
(1) the design and administration of 
the state pay plan; 
(2) the design and administration of 
the state classification system and 
procedures for determining schedule 
assignments; 
(3) position classification studies, 
including periodic desk audits, except that 
an agency may conduct classification studies 
and desk audits as necessary under Subsection 
67-19-9(2) consistent with a delegation 
agreement approved by the department; 
(4) maintenance of registers and 
certification of eligible applicants; 
(5) the monitoring of state agency 
personnel practices to determine compliance 
with state personnel guidelines, including 
equal opportunity and affirmative action; and 
(6) the maintenance of central 
personnel records. U.C.A. 67-19-8 (1989). 
(Emphasis supplied). 
In order to implement the foregoing broad statutory 
provisions, the Legislature gave the Director of State Personnel 
statutory authority to adopt rules pursuant to the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. See U.C.A. 67-19-6(1) (d) (1979, 
as amended). In accomplishing the task of promulgating rules, 
the Director adopted the following rule (as it applied at the 
time of the grievance herein) governing the role of State 
Personnel: 
"As staff support to the Governor, the 
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purpose of the Department of Human Resource 
Management is to facilitate improvement in 
the management of human resources and to 
provide professional personnel services to 
state and local government which emphasize 
human dignity. The department is responsible 
for the following: 
(1) Establishment of. and monitoring 
compliance with, statewide policies, rules, 
standards and procedures governing employment 
with the State of Utah. 
(2) Technical assistance, coordination 
and support of personnel activity in agencies 
having their own personnel management 
resources. 
(3) Comprehensive personnel support of 
those agencies which do not have their own 
personnel management resources. 
(4) Final approval of all personnel 
actions taken by agencies." (Emphasis 
supplied). R468-2-2, Utah Administrative 
Code 1990. 
Furthermore, the Director mandated, by rule, that state 
agencies have a legal obligation to comply with the USPM Act and 
rules adopted by the Director: 
"Individuals are employed by the State of 
Utah but directed in their assignments by 
agencies, which agencies have the 
responsibility to manage their own human 
resources in compliance with these rules, 
reserving the ability and authority to 
correct administrative errors. 
(1) The Executive director, DHRM, may 
authorize special exceptions to provisions of 
these rules when permitted by law and when 
justified by unique and compelling 
circumstances in an agency consistent with 
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R468-2-2. 
(2) Agency personnel records, 
practices, policies and procedures are 
subject to fact finding audit by the DHRM. 
(3) In accordance with section 67-19-
13(2) UCA, no new employee shall be hired in 
a state position covered by this statute, and 
no employee shall be changed in pay, title or 
status, nor shall any employee be paid unless 
certified by the Executive Director, DHRM, as 
eligible under the provisions of or rules 
promulgated according to this act. 
(4) In cases of serious noncompliance 
with the State Personnel Management Act, 67-
19 UCA, and the rules contained herein, the 
Executive Director, DHRM, may find the 
responsible agency official to be subject to 
the penalties prescribed by section 67-19-
18(1) UCA pertaining to misfeasance, 
malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. 
(Emphasis supplied). R468-2-3, Utah 
Administrative Code 1990. 
The foregoing statutes and rules unequivocally prescribe 
that the Department of Corrections is duty bound and required to 
comply with all State Personnel rules, standards, guidelines, and 
policies. Moreover, since State Personnel cannot delegate the 
administration of the pay plan, Petitioner Morgan respectfully 
submits that the Department of Corrections has only that 
authority to implement and administer compensation levels of 
departmental employees in a fashion consistent with State 
Personnel rules, standards, guidelines, and policies. With the 
foregoing principles in mind, Petitioner Morgan respectfully 
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submits that it is now appropriate to examine the state 
standards, guidelines and policies regarding compensation and 
what is more particularly described as a pay inequity. 
II. 
STATE PERSONNEL POLICIES AND THE UTAH STATE 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT REQUIRE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TO TREAT EMPLOYEES 
CONSISTENTLY AND FAIRLY. 
Petitioner Morgan filed a grievance (along with 19 other 
individuals) in July of 1990, asserting that the recent hiring of 
one Randy Richins created a pay inequity such that her pay should 
be adjusted to remedy this injustice. After filing her grievance 
(and through discovery of other materials), Petitioner Morgan 
discovered that one Scott Pepper had been hired at a salary rate 
higher than that of Petitioner Morgan. Petitioner Morgan also 
ascertained that Mr. Pepper had less directly related education 
and experience than does Petitioner. It is this unfair 
discrepancy between the pay of Morgan and Mr. Pepper that 
Petitioner Morgan challenged below before the Career Service 
Review Board and now challenges before this Court. 
The concept of a "pay inequity" is neither statutorily 
defined nor defined by rule. The Director of State Personnel, 
Earl Banner, admitted, in a letter dated August 8, 1990, (a copy 
of which is set forth in the Addendum), however, that such a 
circumstance does exist: 
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"The definition of an inequity is an 
injustice or unfairness as it relates to 
employees1 compensation. An inequity as it 
relates to salaries of employees in the same 
classification would be evidenced by 
difference salaries paid to different 
employees when other variables are the same 
or equal. Variables to consider are 
education, experience, hire dates/rates, 
performance ratings, merit increase amounts, 
etc." (R. 132, Grievant Exhibit 10). 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Mr. Banner also specified that "agencies have the 
responsibility to be consistent in their treatment of employees" 
and "in instances of identified inconsistency, there may, in 
fact, be unfair or unjust treatment." Mr. Banner further 
proscribed the methodology for determining whether an inequity 
exists: 
"The actual salary on the range is dependent 
on a great number of variables. The 
variables justify different salary rates for 
people in the same classification and salary 
range. Only when the variables are the same, 
but salaries are different, does an inequity 
exist." (R. 133, Grievant Exhibit 10). 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Prior to writing his letter of August 8, 1990, Mr. Banner 
also issued (to all state agencies), a document entitled "DHRM 
Bulletin - Subject Hiring up to mid point of salary range" (a 
copy of which is set forth in the Addendum). In this Bulletin, 
Mr. Banner required all state agencies to submit requests for 
special salary adjustments when the hiring of a new employee 
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creates what he describes as a "pay inequity condition." Mr. 
Banner further mandated that "potential inequities are to be 
identified, studies and resolved before being created." It is 
thus firmly established that State Personnel recognized the 
concept of pay inequity when Petitioner Morgan filed her 
grievance in July of 1990. 
Further, that State Personnel has not adopted formal rules 
or regulations regarding pay inequities is not fatal to 
Petitioner Morgan's claim inasmuch as there is significant 
statutory authority in the USPM Act and elsewhere to support a 
claim for pay inequity. U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(b) (1988) requires 
that classification of positions occurs in a fashion such that 
"the same schedule of pay may be applied equitably to all 
positions in the same class." U.C.A. 67-19-12(4) (b) also 
requires State Personnel to design pay plans to achieve "equal 
pay for equal work." The USPM Act expresses the Legislature's 
intent to treat employees on the basis of "comparative merit" and 
for the provisions of the USPM Act to be implemented and 
interpreted so that employees receive "fair treatment based on 
the value of each employee's services." See U.C.A. 67-19-2(3) & 
(6); see, also, Phillips v. General Services Admin., 917 F.2d 
1297, 1298 (Fed. Circ. 1990) (merit system principles can be used 
to interpret personnel statutes and rules); accord, Alaska 
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Public Employees Ass'n v. State, 831 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1992). 
Petitioner Morgan respectfully submits that "equitable 
application" of a "schedule of pay" when combined with the 
concepts of "equal pay for equal work" justifiably supports the 
State Personnel policy that an injustice regarding employees1 
compensation is remediable. To hold otherwise would ignore 
Legislative intent because you would not be treating employees 
based on comparative merit (U.C.A. 67-19-2(3)); you would not be 
giving an employee fair treatment based on his/her services 
(U.C.A. 67-19-2(6); and you would not be implementing a 
statewide personnel program that fosters careers in public 
service. 
The USPM Act also contains broad and all-encompassing 
language regarding the scope of a grievance that can be filed by 
an employee: 
"All grievances based upon a claim or charge 
of injustice or oppression, including 
dismissal from employment, resulting from an 
act, occurrence, commission, or condition 
shall be governed by Title 67, Chapter 19a, 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures, and Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act." U.C.A. 67-19-30(2) (1992). (Emphasis 
supplied). 
The provisions of Title 67, Chapter 19a, Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures, also permits an employee to file a grievance 
based "upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression ...," 
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see U.C.A. 67-19a-301(3) (1979), and broadly defines the term 
grievance: 
"(5) 'Grievance1 means: 
(a) a complaint by a career service 
employee concerning any matter touching upon 
the relationship between the employee and his 
employer; and 
(b) any dispute between a career 
service employee and his employer," U.C.A. 
67-19a-101(5) (1991). (Emphasis supplied). 
Furthermore, the Grievance and Appeal provisions specifically 
permit an employee to file a grievance concerning any issue 
involving wages or salary. See U.C.A. 67-19a-302(1). Petitioner 
Morgan therefore submits that State Personnelfs policy of 
recognizing pay inequities is justified. 
Prior to July of 1990, State Personnel had also specified, 
by administrative rule, that pay inequities should be prevented: 
"Individuals will typically be hired at the 
minimum of the approved range. However, 
agencies have full responsibility and 
authority to hire up to midpoint of the 
approved range. The department head is 
responsible for providing funding and for 
preventing inequities as determined by agency 
management." R468-7-3(2). 
The Director of State Personnel changed R468-7-3(2) in 1990, 
however, to provide: 
"Individuals will typically be appointed at a 
minimum pay of the approved range. However, 
agencies have full responsibility and 
authority at their discretion to hire up to 
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midpoint of the approved range. Hiring above 
the minimum of the range shall not be used as 
justification to increase the salary of 
current incumbents except where approved 
market date supports such increases." (468-
7-3(2) (1990). 
The 1990 change was motivated not by an intent to eliminate 
the concept of pay inequity but to limit abuse by various state 
agencies: 
"A. I can give you some background on why it 
was changed, because some departments could 
easily create what may be termed an inequity 
by hiring people, say, five percent above the 
minimum of the entry range who had equal or 
less education experience than current 
incumbents who were being paid at the entry 
level and had not advanced on the range 
because of the many merit freezes and lack of 
merit increases the State has suffered for 
the last five years. 
And so one way, from a department head 
perspective, I guess, to advance or increase 
everybody's salary would be to intentionally 
create an inequity by hiring someone, as I 
indicated, five or ten percent higher than 
minimum and then saying, Oops, we've got to 
solve this problem by moving all of these 
more senior and more qualified people who are 
being paid less, and they would have to be 
moved equal to or higher than the new hire to 
correct or solve the inequity. 
So there was some attempt to prohibit 
that kind of practice in the mind of the 
executive director. I'm not sure this new 
wording was that successful in addressing the 
problem. That was the reason." (R. 394, 
lines 1-22). 
Mr. McDonald (Director of Compensation for State Personnel) 
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acknowledged, however, that departments were required under the 
1990 version of R468-7-3(2) to prevent inequities by studying the 
situation prior to hiring a new employee. (R.398, lines 15-21). 
Mr. McDonald also acknowledged that state agencies were required 
to seek special salary adjustments when pay inequity 
circumstances arise. (R.414, lines 1-8). Significantly, the 
current version of R468-7-3(2) is found in R477-7-3(2) and 
contains an absolute prohibition against hiring a new employee at 
a salary higher than an incumbent: 
"Individuals will typically be appointed at 
step one (1) of the approved salary range. 
No salary offer to a new hire shall be made 
if it exceeds the salary rate of any current 
incumbent, equally qualified, in the same job 
classification and salary range of the new 
hire and in the same division of the agency. 
Exceptions will require written justification 
from the department head and approval from 
DHRM. No offers of appointment shall exceed 
step eight (8) on the general classified and 
data processing pay plans, and step six (6) 
on the trade and craft pay plan, unless 
approved as an exception by the Director, 
DHRM." R477-7-3(2) (1993). (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Petitioner Morgan thus submits that state administrative 
rules and policies mandate that the Department of Corrections 
treat Petitioner Morgan consistently and fairly by preventing 
and/or correcting a pay inequity circumstance. 
Finally, Petitioner Morgan submits there exists decisions of 
the Career Service Review Board and case law from other states 
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which support the concept of a pay inequity. In C. C. Patel v. 
Div. of Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991), the CSRB was 
faced with a situation in which Mr. Patel (an Engineer Level IV) 
was being paid less than a newly hired Engineer III. Mr. Patel 
grieved the matter and his grievance was denied because the state 
agency had not been able to hire an Engineer III at any lower pay 
level than that given to the new hire. The CSRB acknowledged, 
however, that its role was to adjudicate disputes concerning 
salary and wages: 
"Inasmuch as the State's compensation system 
has been set up by the Legislature to compare 
its "comparability of state salaries to wages 
and salaries paid by private enterprise and 
other public employment for similar work" 
(67-19-12(4)(b)(ii), it is not unreasonable 
to believe that some stresses and strains 
will result on occasion concerning salary 
comparisons between certain employees. That, 
however, is why this Board exists; to review 
and adjudicate those matters brought through 
the grievance procedure, including disputes 
and complaints anent salary and wages." 
Patel. at 12. (Emphasis supplied). 
In John H. Jones v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 4 CSRB 38 
(1992), Mr. Jones filed a grievance asserting that he had been 
denied a five percent (5%) pay increase that had been granted to 
other similarly situated employees. The CSRB affirmed the Step 5 
Hearing Officer's granting of Mr. Jones' grievance. In so doing, 
the CSRB acknowledged the Legislature's intent to treat employees 
fairly: 
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"The State expects that merit and achievement 
will determine the advancement of its 
employees, and that employees will be 
properly rewarded with a salary and benefits 
that encourages excellence amidst a fair 
employment system (67-19-2(3)). To hold 
Jones unfairly to his Grade 21 Trooper II pay 
rate while concomitantly placing him at the 
duties and responsibilities of a Grade 23, 
when the other seven troopers received a five 
percent increase for their advancement to 
Grade 23 but which he did not, is not an 
acceptable merit system practice. Such 
unfairness and disparate treatment require 
redress for Agent Jones. Id.f at 20. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Lastly, Petitioner Morgan submits that the decision of 
Thoresen v. Dept. of State Civil Service. 433 So.2d 184 (La. App. 
1st Circ. 1983) is supportive authority for the proposition that 
pay inequities are to be remedied. In Thoresen, a group of 
employees (that were classified as Engineer Specialists) 
challenged a pay plan that differentiated between their 
classifications and that of Engineers. The Engineer Specialists 
claimed they were performing the same work as Engineers and 
should be compensated likewise. The Appellate Court agreed and 
stated that "[It] is a fundamental notion that employees who 
perform equal work should receive equal pay." Id., at 195. 
Persuasively, this "equal pay" concept is identical to the 
statutory language found in the USPM Act (see U.C.A. 67-19-
12(4)(b)(i)) and further supports Petitioner Morgan's claim that 
a pay inequity claim is justifiable and warranted. 
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In summary, the concepts of inequity and injustice are 
firmly embodied in the USPM Act; in State Personnel rules, 
practices and policies; in decisions of the Career Service 
Review Board; and in decisions from other jurisdictions. This 
Court should therefore acknowledge that justice can only be 
served by rectifying pay inequities in public employment. We now 
term to an analysis of this case. 
III. 
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS VIOLATED STATE 
PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STATUTORY MANDATES BY 
UNFAIRLY AND UNJUSTLY CREATING A PAY INEQUITY 
CIRCUMSTANCE REGARDING PETITIONER MORGAN AND 
THE CSRB ERRED BY FAILING TO ORDER THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TO CORRECT THE 
INJUSTICE. 
Sherry Morgan had been employed with the State of Utah for 
twenty one (21) years at the time she filed her grievance in July 
of 1990. During her first seven (7) years, she worked for the 
former Department of Social Services. Sherry's remaining 
thirteen (13) years and ten (10) months of employment were in the 
position of Adult Probation & Parole agent with the Department of 
Corrections. Sherry also holds a Bachelor of Science degree in 
the directly related field of Sociology, and was earning $13.34 
per hour at the time of the grievance herein. 
Sherry's grievance is predicated on comparing her 
circumstances, as set forth above, with those of a newly hired 
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Adult Probation & Parole agent, Scott Pepper. Mr. Pepper had 
seventeen (17) years of directly related experience to the 
position of Adult Probation & Parole agent. Mr. Pepper does hold 
a bachelor's degree but his degree is in a field unrelated to the 
position of an Adult Probation & Parole agent. 
The Step 5 Hearing Officer determined that Mr. Pepper had 
greater experience than Sherry and therefore precluded Sherry 
from prevailing on her grievance. The Hearing Officer 
acknowledged, however, that Sherry's combined education and 
experience exceeded that of Mr. Pepper but concluded that the 
Department of Corrections did not have to consider directly 
related education in determining salary. Sherry appealed to the 
full body of the Career Service Review Board and the CSRB 
affirmed: 
"UDC considered, evaluated, and credited 
educational background for purposes of 
qualifying persons to meet DHRM's "minimum 
qualifications" (MQs) for AP&P Agent 
positions. The Department was not required 
by law (neither by statutory provision nor 
administrative rule), or by UDC's own 
policies and procedures, to credit equally 
years of educational experience along with 
directly related work experience for purposes 
of salary setting. The three Appellants have 
not shown a violation of any statutory 
provision, administrative rule or promulgated 
policy or procedure in the comparables' 
hiring process. Appellants have failed to 
meet their burden of proof of showing any 
direct, actionable, unreasonable, or 
unjustified inequity, including any personnel 
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rule violation, even with timeliness 
questions aside." Conclusion of Law Number 
28, Step 6 Decision, at 18. 
The CSRB erred in making the foregoing conclusion because it 
simply ignored the "DHRM Bulletin" dated July 1, 1990, which 
specifies that "inequities are created when a newly hired 
employee is paid more than a current incumbent." (See Exhibit 9, 
set forth in the Addendum). Further, that Bulletin specifies the 
reasons that can justify a difference in pay between a new hire 
and an incumbent: 
"1) Higher education credentials 
2) More total employment experience 
applicable to the position 
3) Low performance ratings that may have 
restricted the pay level of the current 
employee(s)." R.131 - See Exhibit 9 set 
forth in the Addendum. 
Despite this clear mandate, the Hearing Officer and the CSRB 
believe the Department of Corrections has the authority to simply 
ignore Sherry's directly related educational credentials! 
Moreover, the Hearing Officer and the CSRB also ignored the 
opinion of the Director of State Personnel who opined, in his 
letter of August 8, 1990, that: 
"The actual salary on the range is dependent 
on a great number of variables. The 
variables justify different salary rates for 
people in the same classification and salary 
range. Only when the variables are the same, 
but salaries are different, does an inequity 
exist." R.133. 
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The Hearing Officer and the CSRB lastly ignored the 
testimony of Dick McDonald (the person in charge of compensation 
for State Personnel) who opined that comparing a "new hire" with 
an incumbent requires consideration of the individuals' 
respective educational credentials: 
"Q. I mean, if I was a new hire, or if 
someone is newly hired with a rate equal to 
mine or above mine, does that automatically 
meant that someone could get a salary 
increase? 
A. It's not automatic. You would have to 
consider all of the other criteria, 
variables, such as their education and 
experience." R.387, lines 13-19. 
Despite the foregoing policies and guidelines adopted by 
State Personnel, the CSRB asserts the Department of Corrections 
has authority to determine whether education credentials are 
relevant to assessing pay inequity! Such an assertion is 
astonishing when considered in light of the specific authority 
granted to state agencies under the USPM Act: 
"State agencies shall be responsible for the 
following personnel functions: 
(1) initial job descriptions; 
(2) recommending position 
classifications and grade allocations; 
(3) selecting qualified applicants for 
appointment and promotion to vacant 
positions; 
(4) conducting performance evaluations; 
(5) disciplining employees; and 
(6) maintaining individual personnel 
records." U.C.A. 67-19-9 
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Nowhere in the above-quoted statute is the Department of 
Corrections granted authority to deviate from the compensation 
policies adopted by State Personnel. In fact, the USPM Act 
clearly mandates that State Personnel, and only State Personnel, 
shall design and administer the pay plan for state employees. 
U.C.A. 67-19-8(1) (1989). The Department of Corrections thus has 
only that authority (concerning pay issues) granted to it by 
State Personnel pursuant to rules and policies. State personnel 
policies (those embodied in the DHRM Bulletin and Mr. Banner's 
opinion) do not permit an agency to ignore educational 
credentials in assessing a pay inequity situation. The CSRB, 
like the Department of Corrections, ignored State Personnel 
policies and procedures and its decision cannot stand. 
A most interesting facet of the CSRB's decision in this case 
is its reliance on allegations that Petitioner Morgan did not 
show a violation of statute or rule. The CSRB's Conclusion of 
Law Number 28 hereinabove states as much. The conclusion is at 
odds, however, with the CSRB's analysis in Jones v. Dept. of 
Public Safety, supra., a copy of which is set forth in the 
Addendum hereto. 
In Jones, the CSRB determined that Trooper Jones was 
entitled to be treated like all other similarly situated 
employees by receiving a five percent (5%) pay raise incident to 
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a transfer. In ruling in Trooper Jones' favor, the CSRB made the 
following pertinent conclusions of law: 
"(5) The Board concludes as a matter of law 
that the Department made an erroneous 
decision that precluded a special pay 
increase for Agent Jones. The Department is 
obligated to treat all similarly situated 
employees alike, unless there is a reasonable 
or rational purpose in making an exception. 
In the instant case, no rules or statutes 
precluded Agent Jones from receiving the 
special pay adjustment that was granted to 
the other seven selected troopers for UDI 
service.... 
(9) On its face, this salary difference in 
the treatment accorded Jones and the seven 
other similarly situated troopers/agents 
constitutes an impermissible, unfair 
employment practice within the State's civil 
service system. Jones was not treated fairly 
nor equitably vis-a-vis the other troopers/ 
agents when he was advanced to Grade 23 
without receiving the pay rate increase 
awarded to his seven UHP peers." Jones v. 
Dept. of Public Safety, at 16, 17. (Emphasis 
supplied). 
Petitioner Morgan asserts the underpinnings of the Jones 
decision do not rest upon Trooper Jones proof that the Department 
of Public Safety violated any rule but rather on whether he was 
treated fairly and consistently with other similarly situated 
employees. Sherry Morgan sought the same treatment before the 
CSRB - that she be treated with the same dignity, equity and 
fairness contemplated by the USPM Act and State Personnel. The 
CSRB did not follow Jones and therefore failed to follow its own 
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decisions in deciding the case at bar. 
In summary, it is undisputed that Sherry Morgan's combined 
education and experience exceeds that of the newly hired 
employee. It is undisputed that the pay differential ($0.47 per 
hour) between Sherry Morgan's pay and that of the "new hire" is 
not de minimis inasmuch as the differential is equivalent to a 
different pay step between Sherry and Mr. Pepper. It is 
therefore incumbent upon this Tribunal to rectify the injustice 
being perpetuated upon Sherry Morgan. The Department of 
Corrections does not have unfettered discretion to treat 
employees in any manner it chooses to do so. This Court should 
send a message to state agencies that it cannot trample on long-
time employees by treating them in such a patently unfair and 
unjust manner. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the decision of the Career Service 
Review Board and grant Sherry Morgan's request for a salary 
increase, together with back pay to the date of the filing of the 
grievance. 
Dated this / day of *^j^ty^i^y- , 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ullip w. Dyer" 
k/mi/Crawford.bri/APPl Attorney for Petitioner Morgan 
28 
ADDENDUM 
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: : 
CATHY CRAWFORD, et al., DECISION AND FINAL 
Grievant, : 
: AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
CORRECTIONS, : 
: Case Nos. 5 CSRB 45 (Step 6) 
Agency. : 8 CSRB/H.O. 119 (Step 5) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level 
review of the above-captioned case on June 17, 1993. The following Board Members heard 
oral argument and later deliberated in an executive session: Chairman Bruce T. Jones, 
Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L. Trujillo. Cathy Crawford, Dale Hansen and 
Sherry Morgan (Appellants) are a remnant group of three employees who have jointly 
appealed a Step 5 Decision, which originally included 20 employees. Phillip W. Dyer, 
Attorney at Law, represented Appellants on behalf of the Utah Public Employees1 
Association (UPEA). Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman represented the 
Utah Department of Corrections (Department and UDC). A certified court reporter made 
a verbatim record of this proceeding, consisting mainly of oral argument before the Board, 
which is commonly referred to as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees• 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures. 
AUTHORITY 
The CSRB • s statutory authority is set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah 
Code Unannotated (1993 Supp.) 
This case proceeded properly through the State• s grievance procedures, and the 
Board has assumed jurisdiction over this appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or Board-level review 
constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under the codified Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures, according to §§67-19a-202(l)(a), -407, and -408, as well as 
constituting a final agency action under §63-46b-14 of the Utali Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA). All the UAPA • s formal adjudicatory provisions are applicable to the CSRB • s 
proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. The Board entered into an executive session for 
deliberation and decision-making, but did not conclude its deliberations until August 12, 
1993, when the Board closed the case record and made an ultimate decision. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
During July 1990, 20 UDC employees filed individual grievances that were 
consolidated into one group grievance at Step 5 pursuant to §67-19a-401(7)(a) and R140-1-1 
Definition, ("Consolidation"), Utah Administrative Code (1990 Supp.). The CSRB 
designated this case as Cathy Crawford, et aL, v. Utah Department of Corrections 
("Crawford"). UPEA represented all aggrieved employees in the Crawford case in contrast 
to the companion case of Michael Hansen, et aL, v. Utah Department of Corrections 
(mHansenm), in which the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME), Local 1009, provided counsel for a smaller group of eight aggrieved employees. 
Both the Crawford and Hansen cases involved allegations of pay equity complaints by 
aggrieved employees who claimed greater years of service and related job experience 
compared with certain more recently hired UDC employees. The Department's Field 
Operations Division employed all Grievants in both group grievances as Adult Probation 
and Parole Agents (AP&P Agents) at the time these grievances were filed. The same CSRB 
hearing officer heard and ruled upon both the Hansen and Crawford cases. Consequently, 
the Board• s examiner made common references between both cases during their procedural 
processing, as well as during the actual Step 5 evidentiary hearings of both cases, as did each 
party' s counsel. 
Initially, both group grievances had been combined for a joint hearing under 
R140-1-1, Definition ("Joint Hearing11). However, as case management of both the 
Crawford and Hansen group grievances became unworkable on a consolidated basis due to 
certain recognizable distinctions, the CSRB administrator separated the cases effective 
March 8, 1991. 
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Almost three years have elapsed between the time Grievants filed their statements 
of grievance and the presentation of oral argument at Step 6 before this Board in the 
Crawford case. The three Appellants deserve a brief explanation for this long processing 
period. 
Grievants filed their statements of grievance during July 1990, with the CSRB 
hearing officer1 s Step 5 or evidentiary decision being issued two years later. During this 
24-month period, the first appointed CSRB hearing officer conducted a prehearing 
conference, issued a Prehearing Conference Order, then upon a party • s request, recused 
himself based upon good cause. The second CSRB hearing officer conducted a prehearing 
conference to sort out the issues, dealt with several motions to dismiss, received several 
other motions on which he made rulings, requested written briefing on specific legal issues, 
and entered a few interim orders (in both cases). The Step 5 hearing was noticed up with 
four separate dates, along with an additional half-dozen continuances being requested and 
issued. After Appellants Crawford, Hansen1 and Morgan appealed the Crawford Step 5 
Decision, nearly three months passed before the evidentiary proceedings • transcript became 
available to the parties. Upon access to the Step 5 proceedings' transcript volumes, 
Grievants1 counsel requested and received four separate month-long extensions for 
submitting his brief. Next, Agency • s counsel requested and received a single month-long 
extension. Overall, more than eight months elapsed between requesting the Step 5 
proceedings' transcript and the filing of both parties' Step 6 appeal briefs. 
As only three of the twenty original aggrieved employees participating in the 
Crawford grievance case have perfected an appeal to Step 6 (Appellants Cathy Crawford, 
Dale E. Hansen and Sherry Morgan), this Step 6 Decision is applicable only to Appellantsf 
particular appeal. Thus, this decision is not directed to nor intended for any other former 
Crawford case participants. 
ISSUES 
A. Issues Adjudicated at Step 5 
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing as the 
proper issues to be adjudicated: 
1. Are the grievants entitled to prevail on their respective 
salary grievances? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
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During the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings held on June 18 and July 22-23,1992, the 
CSRB hearing officer dismissed the individual cases of 9 of the 20 aggrieved employees • 
cases. Next, after conducting the de novo evidentiary hearing during which all testimonial 
and documentary evidence were received into the record, the CSRB trier of fact reached 
an ultimate conclusion that denied all 11 remaining Grievants their requested remedy and 
relief. 
B. Issues Presented Upon Appeal to Step 6 
Appellants' Brief asserts that the CSRB hearing officer's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decision (Step 5 Decision) is an inadequate legal decision. 
Appellants have characterized their confusion over the Step 5 Decision in the following 
passages: 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue this case on appeal for 
one very simple reason, to-wit: The Hearing Officer has not 
made specific, detailed findings of fact which can be pointedly 
addressed, refuted or supported. Instead, the Hearing Officer 
has labeled his rather rambling discussion as being Findings of 
Fact when, in fact, many of his findings are conclusions of law 
. . . [Example omitted.] Grievants are thus prohibited from 
pointing out facts that support or refute the conclusions because 
no finding exists to support the conclusions . . . . 
It is thus Grievants' initial position that the Step 5 Hearing 
Officer has failed to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact 
so as to permit this Tribunal to effectively review his analysis 
and decision (Brief, pp. 1-2). 
Appellants aver that the Step 5 Decision is ambiguous in its factual findings and legal 
conclusions, and that the evidentiary decision lacks both factual sufficiency and specificity. 
Therefore, they have identified the four most "pertinent issues" needing resolution. 
Appellants' four pertinent issues constitute their four legal arguments at Step 6, which they 
have expounded on in their Brief as follows: (1) the hearing officer committed reversible 
error by not properly interpreting certain provisions of the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act consonant with its policy provisions, (2) the hearing officer erred when 
determining that law enforcement experience was directly related to an AP&P Agent's 
position for pay equity analysis, (3) the hearing officer erred when not comparing 
Appellants' salary data with all (i.e., meaning Bassi's and Benson's) of the 
"comparables •" salary data presented into evidence, and (4) the hearing officer erred when 
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concluding that Appellants had not been harmed by existing pay inequities. At the Step 6 
proceeding, Appellants emphasized and expanded upon their first and fourth points, while 
leaving the second and third points to their Brief. 
C. The Board*s Appellate Standards of Review 
Effective November 2, 1992, the Board amended its Standards of Review provision 
at R137-1-21 D. Thus, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to 
Appellants' appeal to this Board-level review. The Board's review standards state: 
D. The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards 
of review shall be based upon the following criteria: 
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. 
If the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its 
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or 
additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then 
determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance 
with the correctness standard, with no deference being granted 
to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of 
the CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions 
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon 
the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the 
above provisions. 
The Board reviews this appeal based upon the above-quoted provisions. 
D. Burden of Proof at Step 6 
Appellants are the moving party at Step 6 and therefore shoulder both the burdens 
of proof and of persuasion. To prevail, Appellants must demonstrate under the standards 
set forth at R137-1-21 D., above, that reversible error is present in the Step 5 Decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Board now exercises its vested discretionary authority in making and entering 
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into the case record its own findings of fact and legal conclusions, in addition to those 
findings already made at the proceedings below. 
A, General Findings 
1. Initially, there were 20 Grievants in this pay equity group grievance. Nine 
Grievants had their respective cases dismissed during the evidentiary proceedings held on 
June 18, July 22-23, 1992. 
2. The Step 5 Decision denied remedies to the following 11 Grievants: Karl Bartell 
(Bartell), Cathy Crawford (Crawford), Patricia Dennis (Dennis), Dale E. Hansen (Hansen), 
Jeffrey MacLeod (MacLeod), Sherry Morgan (Morgan), Lisa Shavers (Shavers), 
Katherine Straten (Straten), Beverly Thomas (Thomas), Paul Truelson (Truelson) and 
Gerald White (White). 
3. None of the just-named 11 Grievants prevailed at the Step 5 or evidentiary level. 
The Step 5 Decision ultimately concluded that no salary inequities had been created when 
the Department credited three former police officers with their respective years of law 
enforcement experience. Nor did any of the eleven Grievants prevail when they compared 
themselves with two State employees who had accepted lateral pay-rate transfers into AP&P 
Agent positions frortr other State agencies. 
4. All the just-named 11 Grievants were AP&P Agents within the Departments 
Field Operations Division during the processing of this grievance. 
5. At the grievance's filing date (July 26, 1990), the 11 Grievants' various lengths 
of service time as AP&P Agents ranged from Morgan' s 13 years, 10 months down to 
Truelson' s 2 years. Ten Grievants held the position of AP&P Agent, Grade 23, while only 
Truelson held the position of AP&P Agent, Grade 21. 
6. Crawford, Dennis, Straten, Shavers, and Thomas had the same pay rate of $11.23 
at the grievance filing, while the other six had various pay rates: Morgan ($13.34), 
Bartell ($14.29), Hansen ($12.47), White ($11.34), MacLeod ($11.73) and Truelson ($9.81). 
7. All 11 Grievants claimed personal harm based upon the Department's filling 
AP&P Agent positions either by hiring new employees or by the acceptance of current State 
employees transferring into Field Operations. Grievants • specific complaint was against five 
recruited AP&P Agents who had been offered salaries at pay rates above the minimum 
entry levels. 
8. The five newer AP&P Agent hires used as "comparables" by the three Appellants 
-6-
were: William Brad Bassi (Bassi), Ronald W. Benson (Benson), Kenneth Lee Bingham 
(Bingham), Scott Pepper (Pepper) and Randy Richins (Richins). All five newer AP&P 
Agents had been hired (or transferred) above the minimum entry level pay rate for their 
respective salary grade, whether on Grades 19, 21 or 23. These five newer agents were 
designated as "comparables" during these proceedings, which term is still applicable. 
B. Appellant Cathv Crawford 
9. The Department hired Crawford in July 1986, as an AP&P Agent, at entry-level 
Grade 17 (A-3, G-24). 
10. On a yearly basis, Crawford received promotions through AP&P Agent ranks as 
she advanced from Grade 17 to Grades 19, 21 and 23. Crawfordf s most recent promotion 
occurred in July 1989, when she advanced to the senior working level of AP&P Agent, 
Grade 23. 
11. At the filing of this group grievance (July 1990), Crawford had exactly four 
years • direct AP&P Agent experience. At that time, her pay rate was $11.23 per hour. 
12. Crawford, at her grievance filing, had been credited with an additional three 
years and two months of directly related job experience for her prior service as a 
Correctional Officefwith the Salt Lake County Sheriff • s Department. Thus, along with her 
four years • AP&P Agent service, Crawford • s total directly related job experience for both 
AP&P Agent and prior Correctional Officer duty amounted to seven years, two months of 
service. (G-24, G-41, T. I-pp. 154, 167.) 
13. Crawford selected Bassi, Benson, Bingham, Pepper and Richins as her 
"comparables" for grieving "new hire" pay equity comparisons (Grvts. Exht. 24; T. I 
pp. 174-75). 
C Appellant Dale E. Hansen 
14. Hansen began his employment with UDC in April 1975. Appellant Hansen 
commenced as a Probation Aide, later advanced to an AP&P Technician, and still later he 
received a promotion to Correctional Counselor at Grade 17. Hansen served as a 
Correctional Counselor from October 1979 through January 1986. During this time, he 
advanced to Counselor, Grade 19. In 1986, Hansen received promotion to Correctional 
Counselor, Grade 21, which was the top position in that career ladder series. As 
Agent Hansen had accrued six years and four months of counseling experience, this time 
period was credited to his total service as being directly related AP&P Agent experience 
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(Agency Exht. 3). 
15. In January 1986, Hansen transferred from a Grade 21 Correctional Counselor 
to a Grade 21 AP&P Agent, at his same pay rate. In March 1986, Hansen was promoted 
to AP&P Agent, Grade 23. (T. I. 16-17; Agency Exht. 5.) 
16. At the time of grievance filing (July 1990), Hansen had four years, six months 
of AP&P Agent experience (Agency Exht. 3). Additionally, Agent Hansen also received 
credit for his prior tenure (i.e., six years and four months) as a Correctional Counselor, 
which brought his total credited AP&P service to ten years, ten months.2 In July 1990, 
Hansen's pay rate was $12.473 per hour as a Grade 23 Agent. (Agency Exht. 3, 5.) 
17. Hansen compared his AP&P Agent employment experience and pay rate with 
those of newer Agents Bassi and Pepper. (G-l; T. I p. 19.) 
D, Appellant Sherry Morgan 
18. In 1966, Sherry Morgan began employment with the State • s Division of Family 
Services in the former Department of Social Services (now Human Services) as a Social 
Service Worker, Grade 17. In March 1973, Appellant Morgan transferred from Social 
Services into an AP&P Agent position with UDC. As her Social Services• duties were not 
directly related to AP&P duties, she received no credit for her prior State employment 
(Agency Exhts. 3; T. I. p. 227). 
19. From 1973 into 1977, Morgan advanced in the AP&P Agent career ladder series 
from Grade 15 to Grade 23. In late 1977, Appellant Morgan resigned for personal reasons 
(Agency Exht. 3; T. I p. 227). 
20. In 1980, the Social Services Department re-hired Morgan as an Eligibility 
Examiner, Grade 21, while placing her in an exempt or Schedule A position. The following 
year Morgan worked as an Eligibility Technician, Grade 15, at a lesser pay rate but in a 
Schedule B or career service position (Agency Exht. 3). 
21. On May 30, 1981, Morgan transferred to an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position 
with UDC's Field Operations Division. Effective May 29, 1982, Appellant Morgan was 
promoted to an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, position, which position she continued to serve in 
until her grievance filing (July 1990). (T. I pp. 227-28; Agency Exht. 3.) 
22. At grievance filing, Morgan had 13 years, 10 months of directly related AP&P 
Agent experience as credited by UDC (Agency Exht. 5). Agent Morgan credited herself 
with only 13 years and 4 months of directly related AP&P Agent experience (Grvts. 
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Exht. 33). Morgan's pay rate at the grievance filing was $13.34 (Agency Exht. 5), although 
Morgan erroneously stated her pay rate as $12.84 in her Summary Status document (Grvts. 
Exht. 33). 
23. Agent Morgan selected comparables Bassi and Pepper for pay equity 
comparisons. 
E. Comparable William Brad Bassi 
24. Bassi had been employed with the State's Juvenile Court from February 1975 
until mid-May 1989. Bassi began his career as a Probation Aide, advanced through the 
ranks as a Probation Officer from Grade 15 to 26, finally attaining supervisor status. 
25. As a State employee, Bassi transferred into UDC initially and temporarily as a 
Corrections Trainee, Grade 13, (essentially during his POST Academy certification training), 
at which time he retained his higher Grade 26 Juvenile Court pay rate. After POST 
certification, Bassi received placement at the AP&P Agent, Grade 23, level effective 
August 19, 1989, again retaining his former Juvenile Court pay rate due to his lateral 
transfer action from one State agency to another. (Agency Exht. 2; T. I pp. 206-07.) 
26. Bassi was not a "new hire," but rather a State employee who had transferred 
from one State jurisdiction to another while continuing his State service. 
27. Bassi, with his 15 years • service as a State Juvenile Court Probation Officer, was 
accepted and treated by UDC as a career service employee, not a probationary employee. 
UDC accorded Bassi immediate recognition of his prior merit or tenured status with the 
Juvenile Court (Agency Exht. 2; T. I pp. 206-07). 
28. All three Appellants—Crawford, Hansen and Morgan—selected Bassi as a 
comparable new hire for comparison purposes. 
F. Comparable Ronald Benson 
29. The Department hired Benson as a Correctional Supervisor, Grade 21 on 
May 12, 1986. During October 1987, Benson's position was reclassified to a Security and 
Enforcement Officer, Grade 21, with the same grade and pay rate (Agency Exht. 2). 
30. Effective April 16, 1988, Benson transferred from his Utah State Prison 
assignment to an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position in UDC's Field Operations Division. 
For his intra-departmental transfer, Benson received no pay increase (Agency Exht. 2; T. II 
pp. 9, 11-12, 19, 21, 26). According to State policy R468-7-4.(7), Benson's lateral transfer 
did not entitle him to a salary increase. 
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31. Benson received a promotion to AP&P Agent, Grade 23, one year later, on 
April 15, 1989. 
32. Appellant Crawford selected Benson as a comparable for comparing her service 
length and pay rate (Grvts. Exht. 24). 
G. Comparable Kenneth Lee Bingham 
33. Bingham was employed by the Department on April 2, 1988. As a new hire, 
Bingham began as an AP&P Agent at Grade 19. Bingham advanced to AP&P Agent, 
Grade 21, after completing a full year as a Grade 19. After a second full year, Bingham was 
promoted to Grade 23 (Agency Exhts. 2, 4). 
34. Upon leaving the Weber County Sheriff s Department, Bingham accepted a two 
dollar per hour pay cut to join Field Operations as an AP&P Agent (T. I p. 137). 
35. Bingham had been an AP&P Agent for over two years when Appellants filed 
their grievances in July 1990. As of July 1990, Bingham's pay rate was $12.59 compared 
with Crawford's lesser $11.23 per hour, a difference of $1.36 per hour (Agency Exht. 4, 5; 
T. I pp. 124, 130). 
36. The Department credited Bingham with approximately 14 years and 6 months • 
law enforcement experience at the grievance filing. Bingham • s full service credit was based 
upon a combination of law enforcement experience gained with the Weber County Sheriff' s 
Office, U.S. Army military police duty, and his AP&P Agent service with Field Operations 
(T. I. pp. 127, 130, 133; Grvts. Exht. 22; Agency Exht. 2). 
37. Only Appellant Crawford selected Bingham as a comparable (Grvts. Exht. 24). 
H. Comparable Scott Pepper 
38. Pepper hired on as an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, effective December 23, 1989 
(Grvts. Exht. 48). Pepper • s initial pay rate was $13.28. When the Crawford group grievance 
was filed, Pepper's salary rate had increased to $13.81 per hour (Agency Exht. 2, 4). 
39. The Department credited Agent Pepper with 16 1/2 years' directly related work 
experience (with the Murray City Police Department) upon his hiring, and he had 17 years • 
experience when the grievance filing commenced (Grvts. Exhts. 47, 48). 
40. Appellants Crawford, Hansen, and Morgan each selected Pepper as a 
comparable for length of service and pay rate comparisons (Grvts. Exhts. 1, 24, 33). 
41. As of July 1990, Pepper's 17 years' directly related job experience exceeded 
Crawford's 7 years, 2 months; exceeded Hansen's 10 years, 10 months; and exceeded 
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Morgan's 13 years, 10 months of directly related experience. 
42. Correspondingly, at the time of the grievance filing, Pepper • s pay rate of $13.81 
exceeded Crawford fs $11.23 by $2.58 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
43. Pepper • s pay rate of $13.81 at the grievance filing exceeded Hansen's $12.47 
by $1.34 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
44. Pepper's pay rate of $13.81 at the grievance filing exceeded Morgan's $13.34 
by a more narrow $0.47 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
I, Comparable Randv Richins 
45. UDC hired Richins on July 11, 1990, as an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, at the pay 
rate of $12.17 per hour (Agency Exht. 2). 
46. The Department credited Richins with 14 years, 8 months of directly related job 
experience based upon his prior law enforcement experience (Grvts. Exhts. 46, 48). 
47. Appellant Crawford selected Richins as a comparable for comparing her length 
of service and pay rate (Grvts. Exht. 24). 
48. Richins' pay rate of $12.17 at the grievance filing exceeded Crawford' s $11.23 
by $0.94 (Agency Exhts. 4, 5). 
J. Additional General Findings 
49. In 1985, Gary W. DeLand became the executive director of the Department. 
Director DeLand established policy that resulted in greater law enforcement training, 
emphasis, and capabilities for certain staff, including AP&P Agents. 
50. Director DeLand established a training academy within the Department that 
provided more stringent law enforcement and correctional training leading to Category II 
peace officer certification, in place of the former Category I training of prior years for 
AP&P Agents. 
51. To further emphasize the change to a higher level of peace officer standards 
within the Department, Director DeLand directed that law enforcement training and 
experience should be given equal weight with the more traditional AP&P roles of 
supervision and counseling in the recruitment of new AP&P Agents. 
52. Under Director DeLand, UDC's Field Operations Division created a new 
program known as the Intensive Supervision Unit (ISU). DeLand directed his managers to 
especially recruit new employees who had extensive law enforcement experience, particularly 
from sheriffs• offices, local police departments, and from other law enforcement sources and 
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agencies, to staff the ISU. 
53. Some new recruits transferred into the ISU from other State agencies. Thus, 
Bassi and Benson, for example, are transferees who retained their prior agencies • pay rates, 
who continued their State employment as permanent employees with career service status, 
and who were precluded from needing to serve another probationary period. 
54. A few other newly hired agents had been recruited for AP&P duty in the ISU 
due to their lengthy law enforcement experience. Comparables Pepper, Richins and 
Bingham each had extensive law enforcement experience. At the time of their respective 
hirings, Pepper had 16 1/2 years» law enforcement experience; Richins had 14 years, 8 
months; and Bingham had 14 years, 6 months. 
55. Bingham and Richins had been hired as AP&P Agents at Grades 19 and 21, 
while Pepper had been hired at Grade 23. 
56. Appellants Crawford, Hansen and Morgan selected the following comparables 
for their respective pay inequity comparisons (Grvts. Exhts. 1, 24, 33): 
Crawford Hansen Morgan 
Bassi Bassi Bassi 
Benson 
Bingham 
Pepper Pepper Pepper 
Richins 
57. Appellants Crawford, Hansen, and Morgan each selected Pepper as a 
comparable. All four were at Grade 23 in July 1990. Appellantsf years of directly related 
experience and salary rates at the grievance filing compare with Pepper' s, as follows: 
Name Experience Salary Rates July 1990 
(years and months) 
Pepper 17-00 13.814 
Morgan 13-10 13.34 
Hansen 10-10 12.47 
Crawford 07-02 11.23 
58. A bachelor * s degree in law enforcement or criminal justice meets the State' s 
educational requirement for AP&P Agent service along with a half-dozen other fields of 
major study, or on a year-or-year work experience substitution (Grvts. Exhts. 12-15,45, 49). 
Specified other designated "directly related experience" also qualifies new hires or 
transferees for job experience in addition to law enforcement and criminal justice. Some 
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of the original Grievants qualified for AP&P Agent placement based upon their directly 
related experience such as counseling, correctional officer, jail duty, etc., as alternatives to 
law enforcement experience. 
59. Some individual AP&P Agents perform a lesser amount of law enforcement 
duties, while others perform a greater amount (Grvts. Exht. 35, pp. 6-7; T. II, pp. 45). Thus, 
some AP&P Agents perform more at the law enforcement end of a continuum; others 
perform more at the social work/counseling end (T. II, pp. 62, 64 BAKSH; T. I, pp. 74-75 
McDONALD; T. Ill, pp. 310-11 GILLESPIE). 
60. State agency management, such as UDC officials, may determine how much or 
how little directly related work experience may be credited to new hires for given job titles, 
but must do so on a consistent, even-handed basis (T. I, pp. 73-75 McDONALD). 
61. Appellant Morgan holds a bachelor of science degree in the directly related 
academic field of sociology (Grvts. Exht. 33). Comparable Pepper received a bachelor of 
science degree apparently in the nondirectly related field of international business (Grvts. 
Exht. 42). Pepper" s prior law enforcement experience meets the DHRM Grade 23 AP&P 
Agent classification specification. Pepper* s 17 years • directly related experience exceeds 
Morgan • s 13 years, ten months • AP&P Agent experience. Pepper• s $0.47 per hour more 
than Morgan • s pay rate is not unreasonable, violative of rule or law, improper nor arbitrary. 
Pepper» s more than three yearsf directly related experience justifies his greater salary over 
Morgan • s lesser pay rate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Those terms used in the Utah State Personnel Management Act (USPMA) at 
Utah Code Unannotated (1992 Supp.) §67-19-2, under the heading "Policy of state," such 
as "comparative merit" (3), "fair treatment" (5), and so forth, are broad policy statements. 
As broad policy statements of intent and purpose, they provide both guidance and 
philosophic credence. However, as very general policy statements, they do not contain a 
precise measurable gauge for assessing alleged violations of such terms as "merit 
principles," "fairness" or "inequity." Because these terms are used in a very broad and 
general context, they lack the specificity necessary to be self-executing. 
2. Human Resource Management Rules, July 1, 1990, (hereinafter "DHRM Rules'1) 
defines the personnel action of a transfer as: "Movement of an employee within an agency 
or between agencies from one position to another position for which the employee qualifies, 
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including a change of work location or organizational unit." (R468-1-1.) 
3. DHRM R468-5-5.(4) states that career service employees of one jurisdiction or 
merit system may transfer into another, including transferring into and between Utah's 
executive branch departments, which would include UDC. 
4. Bassi was placed in an AP&P Agent position by the Department under provision 
of a lateral transfer. Substantial evidence shows that Bassi was accorded continuous State 
employment from one merit system jurisdiction to another, specifically from the Juvenile 
Court to UDC. 
5. Both the pay rate and work experience comparisons between Crawford, Morgan 
and Hansen with Bassif s as AP&P Agents are inappropriate and legally insupportable. 
Bassi was not a "new hire" and his pay rate as an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, was, in fact, only 
a continuation of his leaving pay rate from the Juvenile Court. 
6. R468-7-4.(7) states: "Individuals may not be offered salary increases to leave one 
position for another if the positions are of the same salary range whether in the same or a 
different agency." While it may be asserted that DHRM Rules are not applicable or even 
binding on judicial employees (R468-2-l.(l)), UDC treated Bassi as if he had already been 
an executive branch career service employee and the Department properly applied 
DHRMf s transfer provisions to Bassi • s employment circumstance. Thus, Bassi was not 
offered a salary increase to join UDC, but merely retained his former jurisdiction • s leaving 
pay rate upon entering AP&P service. No violation of rule or statute resulted. 
7. Appellants' allegations of a pay rate inequity based upon Bassi' s "hiring rate" 
are legally insupportable inasmuch as Bassi was accorded transfer status from the Juvenile 
Court, not new employee status. Appellants• premise of Bassi as a "new hire" is based 
upon a legally defective comparison, which precludes any measurement of similarly situated 
employment comparisons. Bassi's transfer status and pay rate fully complied with 
DHRM • s transfer requirements. There was no violation of rule in setting Bassi• s starting 
pay rate. It was neither unreasonable nor inappropriate to begin Bassi' s employment with 
Field Operations by maintaining his Juvenile Courtf s leaving pay rate. 
8. Benson clearly was not a "new hire." Agent Benson had been hired by UDC in 
1986 as a Correctional Supervisor, Grade 21. Later, the Department reclassified Benson 
as an Enforcement and Security Officer, also at Grade 21. In April 1988, Benson 
experienced an intra-departmental transfer into an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position. The 
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grieving of a personnel action occurring in 1988 on the grievance filing date of July 26,1990, 
is untimely by Crawford (§67-19a-401(5)(a)). A grievance may only be filed within 20 
working days from the event giving rise to the grievance, or within 20 working days from 
knowledge of the event, but nevertheless, not more than one year after an event's 
occurrence (§67-19a-405(5)(b)). 
9. As Benson entered AP&P as an Agent, Grade 21, and the three Appellants were 
all at Grade 23 upon their grievance filing, the comparison, particularly Crawford's, is 
inappropriate. Appellants may only compare themselves with incumbents if they are in the 
same position title (i.e., AP&P Agent) and at the same grade level (i.e., Grade 23). 
Crawford • s comparison with Benson is fatally defective because she compared her Grade 23 
status to his initial Grade 21 status. Not until one year after his AP&P Agent appointment 
did Benson actually receive a promotion to Grade 23. 
10. UDC treated Benson as an intra-departmental transfer; as such, he was accorded 
all the rights and privileges of a career service employee who had been transferred pursuant 
to DHRM' s R468-7-4.(7). Benson was not a new hire who began serving a probationary 
period as an AP&P Agent; instead, Benson actually continued his accrued annual leave, sick 
leave, career service^tatus, and all the other entitlements of an employee who had already 
been vested with career service status. Crawford' s case against Benson is fatally flawed by 
untimeliness and an inappropriate position comparison, thus by law must fail. 
11. Crawford's comparison with Bingham's pay rate upon his being hired is 
untimely (§67-19a-401(5)(a) and (b)). Bingham was hired in 1988, and Crawford's 
grievance not filed until two years and nearly four months later in 1990. By law, that 
constitutes a fatally defective filing based upon an untimely event, which must result in 
Crawford • s grievance being dismissed. 
12. Bingham was first hired by UDC as an AP&P Agent, Grade 19. Crawford was 
already at Grade 23. Crawford' s comparison to Bingham is inappropriate due to differing 
position levels and salary grades. During a two year period (1988-90), Bingham received 
two promotions, first to Grade 21 then to Grade 23. These two promotions substantially 
increased Bingham' s pay rate over his initial hiring rate of $10.37. But for Bingham' s two 
promotions subsequent to his hiring, his pay rate at the grievance filing ($12.59) would not 
likely have exceeded Crawford's by $1.36 per hour as it did. 
13. The Department was justified in setting Bingham's starting pay rate at $10.37 
--K. 
due to his 14 years' prior law enforcement experience. 
14. Pepper's 17 years' directly related law enforcement experience reasonably 
justifies his higher pay rate of $13.81 over each of the Appellants' lesser rates. Based upon 
Pepper's greater law enforcement service length, his higher pay rate of $13.28 upon entry 
to AP&P Agent service was neither arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, nor an abuse of 
discretion. Moreover, the record evidence does not support any claim to a violation of 
either a personnel rule or a statutory provision, 
15. Prior to July 1, 1990, DHRM's R468-7-3.(2) stated: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum of the 
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and 
authority to hire up to the midpoint of the approved range. 
The department head is responsible for providing funding and 
for preventing inequities as determined by agency management. 
Effective July 1, 1990, DHRM's R468-7-3.(2) was amended to read: 
Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum pay of the 
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and 
authority at their discretion to hire up to midpoint of the 
approved range. Hiring above the minimum of the range shall 
not be used as justification to increase the salary of current 
encumbents [sic] except where approved market data supports 
such increases. (Emphasis supplied to amended wording.) 
16. The amended language of R468-7-3.(2), effective July 1, 1990, eliminated the 
specific responsibility of the department head for "preventing inequities as determined by 
agency management." The "anti-inequity" proscription was eliminated prior to the 
grievance filing on July 26, 1990. 
17. Claims arising out of the "anti-inequity" rule prior to July 1, 1990, may include 
proven economic losses. However, any alleged losses would have to be quantified and 
limited to back pay and accompanying benefits, not general psychological damages nor 
speculative considerations having an impact only on future prospects. 
-18. -Appellants shoulder the burden of proof. The evidentiary standard is substantial 
evidence (§67-19a-406(2)). 
19. The three Appellants must be able to identify specific new hires whose starting 
pay rate differentials relative to theirs cannot be objectively justified. 
20. Department officials did not act in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable, nor did they violate any administrative rule or statue when crediting the 
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comparables for their prior law enforcement experience upon their being hired or 
transferred into AP&P Agent positions. To credit the comparables for their actual law 
enforcement experience fell within the acceptable ambit of management prerogative. 
21. All three Appellants selected Bassi as a comparable. Crawford also selected 
Benson as a comparable. Both Bassi and Benson were current State employees who had 
transferred from one State agency to another. Bassi and Benson retained their prior 
individual pay rates after being transferred. By neither increasing nor decreasing Bassi' s 
and Benson' s pay rates, the Department complied with DHRM' s R468-7-4.(7) (Transfers). 
Therefore, Bassi and Benson are not appropriate comparables for any of the three 
Appellants. 
22. All three Appellants, Crawford, Hansen and Morgan, selected Pepper as a 
comparable. At the grievance filing, Pepper had 17 years' directly related experience 
compared with Crawford' s 7 years and 2 months; Hansen' s 10 years and 10 months; and 
Morgan' s 13 years and 10 months. Pepper' s more extensive directly related experience 
adequately justifies his higher pay rate. Given Pepper' s greater directly related work 
experience, the difference in pay rates is reasonable and rational. 
23. CrawforcTalso selected Richins as a comparable. Richins was hired on July 11, 
1990, subsequent to the elimination of the so-called "anti-inequity" portion of the pre-
July 1, 1990 version of R468-7-3.(2). 
24. Crawford • s selection of Richins for wage comparison was inappropriate because 
Crawford was then positioned on Grade 23 while Richins was hired on Grade 21. 
Furthermore, Richins had 14 years, 8 months of directly related work experience, while 
Crawford had less than half as much with 7 years, 2 months. In light of Richins • greater 
directly related work experience (including law enforcement), no inequity existed between 
Richins' and Crawford' s pay rates at the grievance filing. 
25. Crawford also selected Bingham as a comparable. This comparison is 
inappropriate because Crawford was on Grade 23, while Bingham was hired at a Grade 21. 
Additionally, Bingham had 14 years, 6 months of directly related experience at his hiring as 
compared with Crawford's 7 years, 2 months' experience. Therefore, Crawford's 
comparison to Bingham is acutely flawed. 
26. It properly falls within the managerial prerogative of agency management to 
determine relevant qualifications for agency assignments and staffing, including the 
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qualifications and criteria appropriate to recruiting and selecting AP&P Agents so long as 
such qualifications are reasonable and rational. Pursuant to DHRM' s classification system 
and its promulgated classification specifications, State agencies, including UDC, may assess 
applications for filling positions. 
27. UDC complied with DHRM' s classification system and recruiting strictures. It 
was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for Director DeLand to place prior law 
enforcement experience on a par with prior AP&P Agent experience, or even other types 
of relevant correctional experience, including counseling. 
28. UDC considered, evaluated, and credited educational background for purposes 
of qualifying persons to meet DHRM's "minimum qualifications'1 (MQs) for AP&P Agent 
positions. The Department was not required by law (neither by statutory provision nor 
administrative rule), or by UDC' s own policies and procedures, to credit equally years of 
educational experience along with directly related work experience for purposes of salary 
setting. The three Appellants have not shown a violation of any statutory provision, 
administrative rule or promulgated policy or procedure in the comparables • hiring process. 
Appellants have failed to meet their burden of showing any direct, actionable, unreasonable, 
or unjustified inequity, including any personnel rule violation, even with timeliness questions 
aside. 
29. The hiring of Bingham, Pepper and Richins, along with the transfers of Bassi and 
Benson, did not create pay inequities for Appellants Crawford, Hansen or Morgan. 
Consequently, their appeals must fail and be denied. 
30. The three Appellants1 claims of pay rate inequities anent any or all the 
comparables, are not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, Appellants • complaints are 
determined to be without merit, and their grievances fail for reason of not meeting their 
burden of proof by showing that they have been directly harmed by the Department • s 
employment practices (§67-19a-403(2)(a)(iii)), or that they have been subjected to any 
personnel rule-violation.regarding applicable salary provisions. 
31. The Department's acceptance of certified law enforcement experience for 
placing "new hires" above the entry pay rates and/or up to the midpoint was accomplished 
in conformity with both DHRM's Rules and DHRMf s General Classified State Pay Plan. 
Furthermore, that acceptance was not an unreasonable exercise of managerial discretion. 
The Department is entitled to some reasonable discretion in assessing the type of experience 
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most applicable to hiring AP&P Agents as long as such discretion does not violate DHRM's 
Rules nor evidence inconsistent or unequal treatment within a department • s work force. 
32. The Departments officials did not act inappropriately, unlawfully or 
unreasonably in determining that directly related law enforcement experience may be used 
as a substantial factor in setting individual salary rates of newly hired AP&P Agents. 
33. The State's, i.e., DHRM's, classification specifications for AP&P Agents at 
Grades 17, 19, 21 and 23 (Grvts. Exhts. 12-15) along with other documentary evidence 
(Grvts. Exhts. 2, 35,45 and 49) constitute more than sufficient substantial evidence to show 
that law enforcement experience or law enforcement education, or a combination of both, 
are acceptable in meeting minimum qualifications (MQs) for AP&P Agent entry 
requirements. 
34. The Department relied upon directly related experience, not education, in setting 
newly hired AP&P Agents • individual pay rates. This practice conforms with DHRMf s 
rules and policy, and is neither a violation of law nor an abuse of discretion under the facts 
and circumstances of this case. 
35. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Pepper • s greater salary rate is not 
unwarranted vis-a-vis Morgan • s slightly lesser pay rate given his more than three years of 
directly related experience over Morganf s total directly related experience. 
36. Pursuant to R137-1-21 D. 2., the Board concludes as a matter of law that its 
hearing officer correctly applied the relevant policies, rules and statutes. Furthermore, the 
Board concludes that the Step 5 Decision is both reasonable and rational based upon the 
totality of its factual findings and the record evidence as a whole. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Merit System Terms Within the USPMA 
Appellants aver that the Step 5 Decision errs by failing to interpret certain USPMA 
terms consistent with some of its overall policy provisions. Crawford, Hansen and Morgan 
claim that the following evidentiary paragraph contains reversible error: 
The Hearing Officer concluded in the Hansen case and applies 
the same conclusion to the Crawford case that general language 
in State law and Department of Human Resource Management 
(DHRM) rules promising a personnel system based upon 
"merit principles" and manifesting "fairness" and eschewing 
"discrimination," while valid as statements of policy and intent, 
do not comprise enforceable rules of managerial conduct (Ibid., 
_1Q_ 
p. 2) 
Appellants are referring to the following twofold provisions at §67-19-2: 
(3) It is the policy of this state that comparative merit or 
achievement governs the selection and advancement of 
employees in Utah State government and that employees be 
rewarded for performance in a manner that will encourage 
excellence and strengthen the system. (Appellants • emphasis.) 
* * * 
(6) It is the policy of this state to insure its employees 
opportunities for satisfying careers and fair treatment based on 
the value of each employee9 s services. (Appellants • emphasis.) 
Appellants maintain that the Hearing Officer erred by holding that the above-quoted 
provisions are "statements of policy and intent," but are not self-executing or enforceable 
rules of managerial conduct. By the Hearing Officer • s so holding, Appellants also posit 
that the trier of fact was "predispos[ed] toward favoring management in this particular 
grievance" (Brief, pp. 6-7). 
Appellants appear to read the above statutory provisions according to the way in 
which they desire to have them read, rather than giving these words their plain meaning as 
the Legislature intended (§68-3-11). For example, each of the seven subsections under §67-
19-2 begins, "It is the policy of this state . . ." (emphasis supplied). The CSRB Hearing 
Officer neither stated nor implied that merit system principles are inapplicable to grievance 
hearings. Rather, the CSRB examiner simply stated that these provisions do not comprise 
enforceable rules per se, but constitute broad policy statements. Analogously, in this 
tribunal' s most recent decision we made the following statement about these same statutory 
provisions and terms: "These, of course, are broad policy statements rather than explicit 
legal provisions." (Sylvia Thompson v. Utah Department of Employment Security, 
5 CSRB/H.O. 43 (1993), p. 20.) The introductory statutory phrasing so affirms in each 
instance. Moreover, the record of the entire Step 5 proceedings for both the Crawford and 
Hansen cases evidences many instances where the Hearing Officer allowed all Grievants to 
amend their grievance statements, to search out "comparables" of their choosing not 
previously designated in their grievance statements, to disregard strict time lines, to reject 
several motions to dismiss on various grounds (some of which may have been proper 
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grounds), and to allow Grievants their opportunity for a fair hearing despite some 
procedural and jurisdictional elements working against Grievants. In consequence, the 
Board concludes as a matter of law that the Hearing Officer did not commit reversible error 
regarding any USPMA provisions under §67-19-2 as alleged by Appellants. Nor does the 
entire case record show any predisposition to Agency management. 
B. Law Enforcement Experience as AP&P Agent Experience 
According to Appellants, "The Hearing Officer • s analysis appears to confuse the 
issue of meeting minimum qualifications for the Adult Probation and Parole position with 
the issue of what are equitable salaries for persons occupying an Adult Probation and 
[P]arole position," (Brief, p. 8). The three Appellants as well as the other 17 Grievants 
claimed that their job duties comprise only ten to twenty percent law enforcement duties. 
Therefore, argue Appellants, the newer comparables as AP&P Agents should not receive 
credit for their prior years of law enforcement experience, otherwise salary inequities arise. 
In Finding number 58, we found substantial evidence showing that law enforcement 
experience qualified as one of many types of directly related experience for AP&P Agent 
service as set forth on DHRM' s classification specifications. Although directly related law 
enforcement experience justified above-entry level pay rates for the comparables, many of 
the Grievants also received credit for other types of directly related qualifying work 
experiences for being counselors, correctional officers, and county jailers, etc. The DHRM 
classification specifications for AP&P Agents, Grades 17-23, provided a variety of directly 
related work experiences that benefitted many of the original 20 Grievants with additional 
years of service beyond just their AP&P Agent years • service. Bartell received credit for 
his prior Correctional Officer and his Enforcement Officer service. Crawford received credit 
for her Salt Lake County jailer tenure. Hansen received credit for his prior half-way house 
Counselor years. 
Most of the original 20 Grievants defined their pure law enforcement duties as 
consisting-of-between only ten to twenty percent of their overall AP&P Agent duties. In 
contrast, comparables Bingham, Pepper and Richins, each of who had over 14 years • police 
experience, placed their law enforcement duties as AP&P Agents at 70-80 percent or more. 
They even viewed the non-ISU agents as performing at least 40-50 percent law enforcement 
duties. Human Resource Directors McDonald and Baksh spoke in terms of more social 
work/counseling at one end of the AP&P Agent spectrum and almost pure police work at 
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the other end. Yet all are AP&P Agents whose particular duties and assignments may range 
up or down the continuum as assignments change from time to time. The evidence in the 
record docs not support Appellants' argument that the Hearing Officer erred in 
determining that law enforcement experience was not directly related AP&P Agent work. 
The weight of the evidence, in fact, supports the opposite finding. 
The Board concludes, as a matter of law, that law enforcement experience and its 
qualifying variants as found on DHRM 's class specs, such as police science, criminal justice 
and correctional supervision, directly relate to AP&P Agent duties and may be considered 
for assessing prior experience, and hence for setting pay rates of newly hired agents. 
C. Assessing Status of Transferees 
Appellants • third issue is that the Hearing Officer erred by refusing to compare the 
Appellants' pay rates with those of Bassi and Benson. The latter comparables transferred 
into AP&P Agent service, one from Juvenile Court and the other from within UDC's 
Institutional Operations Division to the Field Operations Division. As shown in 
Conclusions, above, numbers 2-10, Bassi • s and Benson • s entry pay rates into AP&P Agent 
status were governed by DHRM's R468-1-1 (-Transfer"), R468-5-5.(4) and R468-7-4.(7). 
Accordingly, neither Bassi nor Benson received pay rate increases upon their being 
transferred into Field Operations to AP&P Agent positions. The proper administrative rules 
were fully complied with and no violations occurred. Therefore, Appellants' complaint 
regarding any impropriety as to Bassi' s or Benson' s pay rate status is moot. Appellants 
err in asserting that a "transferee [should] not be treated differently than a private applicant 
for the position" (Brief, p. 14). Instead, transferees are entitled to those rights as set forth 
in DHRM's Rules (1990) at R468-5-4.(3) - 4) and -5-5. 
D. Alleged Pay Rate Inequities: Crawford and Pepper 
Appellants maintain that the Step 5 Decision erred in limiting the pay rate 
comparisons between Appellants and the comparables solely to work experience and not to 
education also. The decision below concluded that if Morgan' s 13 years, 10 months' work 
experience was added cumulatively to her four years spent in obtaining a directly related 
bachelor's degree in sociology, her cumulative total would be greater than comparable 
Pepper's 17 years' directly related experience, where no cumulative total included a 
bachelor' s degree in a related field. In that light, the Hearing Officer opined that: 
That one differential of $0.47 per hour does not seem sufficient 
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to refute the management decision that education be used as a 
minimum requirement for entry and that salaries be based on 
directly related experience, Grievants having been credited for 
experience in counselling and other activities in addition to 
probation and parole supervision. (Page 5.) 
The Board agrees with Appellant Morgan that a $0.47 per hour difference would not be 
de minimis absent any justification for the difference. Albeit the Hearing Officer' s analysis 
is correct, and no salary inequity exists between Morganf s and Pepper ' s pay rates. The 
trier of fact concluded that in UDC only directly related experience applies to adjusting new 
hires • entry pay rates-exclusive of years spent in getting an education, advanced degrees, 
or other credentials, etc. Human resource management officials McDonald, McGowan and 
Baksh each testified that only directly related work experience is used in setting initial pay 
rates, not educational attainments. Educational years are applied only against the minimum 
qualifications for each job title • s classification specification. The Hearing Officer noted that 
once an applicant had met the position's educational prerequisite, then education was not 
used again as a management tool or criterion for setting salary ("does not seem sufficient 
to refute the management decision that education be used as a minimum requirement for 
entry and that salaries be based on directly-related experience . . . " ) . In sum, the Step 5 
Decision held that Morgan may not add her four years for a college degree to her 13 years, 
10 months' work experience and thus surpass Pepper• s 17 years' work experience. We 
agree. Pepper ' s higher salary rate is reasonable, justifiable, not violative of rule or law, nor 
an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, to raise any issue in 1990 at grievance filing regarding the salary freezes of 
FY1986-88 is untimely. Matters such as these are governed by the administrative rules 
applicable at the contemporary time period. 
DECISION 
Appellant Crawford's pay equity comparison with Benson fails because: 
(1) Benson's entry into Field Operations and AP&P Agent service was through an intra-
departmental lateral transfer, and (2) Benson began as a Grade 21 Agent while Crawford 
held the higher level of Agent, Grade 23—an inappropriate comparison, and (3), the event 
giving rise to the grievance (Benson' s pay rate at transfer) was untimely filed. 
Ms. Crawford's salary equity comparison with Bingham is fatally defective because: 
(1) the event giving rise to the grievance, i.e., Bingham's hiring, is untimely given that the 
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hiring occurred in April 1988 and the grievance filing in July 1990, (2) Bingham was 
originally hired as an Agent, Grade 19, while Crawford held the higher level of Agent, 
Grade 23, making an improper comparison, and (3) Bingham had twice as many years of 
directly related experience as Crawford. 
Agent Crawford' s comparison with Richins is impermissible and defective be mse: 
(1) Richins was hired after the DHRM provision at R468-7-3.(2) was amended on ^uly 1, 
1990, when the department director's former obligation to prevent salary "inequities" 
under the so-called "anti-inequity" proscription was removed, and (2) Richins, upon his 
hiring, had twice as much directly related experience as Crawford. 
The comparison cases of Crawford, Hansen and Morgan with Bassi are wholly 
defective because Bassi was accepted into Field Operations and AP&P Agent duty through 
an inter-jurisdictional, merit system transfer of a State employee from one State agency to 
another, at no pay increase, but with retention of tenure and career service status. 
Finally, the comparisons of Crawford, Hansen and Morgan with Pepper are defective 
because Pepper had been properly credited with more years of directly related experience 
than each Appellant. 
Based upon the entire record evidence, Appellants appeal must be denied with the 
Step 5 Decision being affirmed. There is no appropriate remedy to the Appellants1 
grievances. 
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DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Member 
David M. Hilbig, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
DATED this 1 fy day of August 1993 
miceTTft 
Chairman 
Career Service Review Board 
ENDNOTES 
1. Grievant Dale E. Hansen in the UPEA case is not to be confused with grievant Michael Hansen in the 
AFSCME (Hansen) companion case. 
2. The Step 5 Decision assigned Hansen with ten years seven months total directly-related AP&P Agent 
experience (Table 1, p. 4). However, Agency Exht. 3 shows the Department crediting Agent Hansen with ten 
years ten months directly-related experience. 
3. Hansen testified that his July 1990 pay rate was $12.33 per hour (T. I p. 18), and so stated and affirmed in 
his Summary Status document (Grvt. Exht. 1). Nevertheless, that figure is in error; Hansen's actual pay rate was 
$12.47 as shown on Agency Exht. 5, an individual departmental computer-generated salary history on Hansen. 
4. Pepper's salary rate upon being hired on December 23,1989, was $13.28; as of July 1,1990, his pay rate had 
increased to $13.81. During the Step 5 proceedings most, if not all, pay rate comparisons between all the 
Grievants and comparables were measured from the date of the grievance filing—July 26, 1990. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code 
Unannoiated §63-46b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated 
§63-46b-14 and -16. 
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Grievant 
Exhibit # 
DHRM Bulletin 0HRM-90-012 
Rule 
Effective Date: 7-1-90 Rdbtncr R468-7-3 
SUBJECT: Hiring Up To Mid-Point Pi^ t 1 of 1 
of Salary Range 
State agencies are authorized to pay salaries up to the mid-
point of the appropriate pay range for newly hired employees if 
market conditions require such action. However, such decisions are 
net to be used to create internal salary inequities with otber 
employees wnich become rationale for subsecuent requests to DHRM 
for approval of special inequity salary adjustments. 
Departments are advised that inequities are created wnen a 
newly hired employee Is paid more than a current incumbent(a) 
unless such pay differential is justified because of one of the 
following r%msonm: 
1. Higher educational credentials 
2* More total employment experience applicable to the 
position 
3. Low performance ratings that may have restricted the oay 
level of the current emoloyee(s) 
In t&+ event of a department decision to hire an individual 
above £ft*H£r*nt 0*y r*t* o f incumbents which creates a pay equity 
conditiaSptpartments are required to auomit requests for special 
salary ijppetaents for current employees with appropriate 
explanations to OKRM to resolve Inequities. 
Potential Inequities are to be identified, etudied ana 
resolved before being created. All funding for special sa'ary 
inequity adjustments is done within base budgets of departments. 
tment of i M i n Resource Management 
CSRB 
Grievant 
August 8, 1990 JXJ 
Suzanne Dandoy, M.D., M.P.H. 
Executive Director 
Department of Health 
BUILDING MAIL 
Dear Suzanne: 
I am writing in response to your memo to me dated July 27, 1990 concerning salary 
grievances in the Division of Environaental Health. It Is ny policy to respond 
officially to agency requests for special salary or inequity adjustments vhen 
they have been subnitted from the Department Director, or where the Division 
Directors have been delegated authority to sake such requests in behalf of the 
Department. DHRM should not be In a position of finalizing an action with 
Division Directors vhen the Department Director has not yet had the opportunity 
to approve the Division request. Yet, ve vill always strive to be a resource 
in discussing potential solutions to Issues MM part of the preliminary 
considerations. 
You have asked that I address the questions that you have raised in your memo 
to Engineers and Environmental Scientists, dated July 27, 1990. As I do so, I 
will reference the attached memo from Dick McDonald dated April 2, 1990. 
Health Question 1 The definition of an inequity is an injustice or unfairness 
MM it relates to employees' compensation. An inequity as it relates to salaries 
of employees In the same classification would be evidenced by different salaries 
paid to different employees when other variables are the semi or equal. 
Variables to consider MTM education, experience, hire dates/rates, performance 
ratings, merit increase amounts, etc. 
Dick McDonald's memo of April 2, states. In regards to what might Justify special 
salary adjustment: "New hire employees are hired at a salary rate equal to or 
above those of current employees, In the same job classification.• 
It would appear that the situation in Environmental Health be such aa inequity 
if there are no specific justifications for differential pMy. 
Health Quest lV.. 2 TH^April 2nd memo pn ous ly mentioned references 
circumstances which do fl££ Justify a special adjustment: -Employees are paid 
different salary rates in the sane c lass i f icat ion pay range because of different 
hire dates, performance racings, and tenure. - I b e l i e v e agency administrators 
select employees for promotion on the basis of such factors MM performance, 
competence, s u i t a b i l i t y for the new position, tenure, e t c . Employees who are 
promoted are se lec ted and rewarded for the above named factors . The amount of 
promotion, MM you know, i s optional at agency d i s c r e t i o n within parameters given 
in DHRH rules. I be l ieve administrators look at the current salary rates of a l l 
other employees in the same c lass i f icat ion before they determine the percent 
increase for those to be promoted into that c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Decisions are then 
made to promote over, equal to, or below the ra te s of current employees. All 
three options are the decision of the agency administrator and are generally 
made to avoid creating inequit ies or morale problems. 
Health Question 3 Employees do not have an ^ent i t lement - to any pay increase, 
except COLA's dictated by the Legislature. Agency administrators control their 
budgets and reward employees within current DHRM rules and guidelines. However, 
agencies have the responsibi l i ty to be cons i s t en t in their treatment of 
employees. In instances of Identified incons i s t enc ie s , there may, in fact, be 
unfair or unjust treatment. 
It i s up to the agency to research a l l the facts surrounding claimed inequities, 
and forward requests for special adjustments to DHRM when the agency i s convinced 
that a situation of unfairness ex i s t s . S p e c i f i c a l l y answering your question, 
Environmental Health promoted certain employees to a higher pay rate than others. 
I don't know i f th i s s i tuat ion that has been created by Environmental Health may 
have resulted in an inequity or i f there are j u s t i f i a b l e reasons for different 
pay as I have not reviewed the detai l of each employee involved. 
The factors to be considered in determining who should have their salaries raised 
have previously been ident i f i ed . Comparisons should be made i n i t i a l l y within 
a work unit for comparable jobs , but some review should be made for comparable 
jobs throughout the entire agency in order to be as consistent and fair MS 
possible in the treatment of a l l employees. 
Hpelth Question 4 Inequitie# don't just happen when employees are promoted. 
Inequities are created either intentionally or through oversight when salary 
Increases are authorized by agency o f f i c i a l s . The way to minimize inequities 
i s simply a careful review of a l l pertinent data each time a MMIMTJ Increase 
decision i s made. Adherence to consistent Internal hiring and promotional 
practices should v i r t u a l l y eliminate a l l inequi t i e s . Prevention i s always better 
than cure. 
In summary, promotions should £&£ create Inequi t i e s with employees vho are 
currently in the MMMM c l a s s i f i ca t ion and salary l e v e l . The salary range for the 
specific c l a s s i f i c a t i o n represents equity for a l l who *r« performing the 
dut ies /respons ib i l i t i e s in that c lass i f i cat ion . The a c n « ; i alary on the range 
i s dependent on a great number of variables. The v«rUM«» Justify different 
salary rates for people in the BMIMM c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and »• : »ry range. Only when 
the variables are the same, but salaries are d i f f e r e n t , 6o«* an inequity ex i s t . 
P*fTA ^ 1 ^ 
£.v*n roougn ^ rowantalf l la leh did not raquast( W* inpucTafora tha o r i g i n a l 
promotional pay dacialona vara aada, va subsaquantly aat a t l a a a t tv i ca v l t h 
thaa to mddr^MB chair problaaa. 
Va v i l l ba happy now to ravlav and raapond to vhatavar tha Haalth Dapartaant 
dmMirmm to submit for tha ldant l f lad lnaquit laa. I f tha j u a t l f l c a t l o n and 
docuaantatlon aubaittad ia aupportiva of granting soaa apac ia l sa lary 
adjustaants, than DHRM v i l l approva than. DHRM v i l l ba happy to furthar d i scuss 
any lssuas nov or aftar your formal raquast. 
Slncaraly, 
Earl J Bannar, Exacutiva Dlractor 
Dapartaant of Human Rasourca Managaaant 
EJB/RRM/J1 
cc: Robart Vhlta 
Bob Hayvood 
Dick KcDonald 
John Mathavs 
Nancy Sechrest - UPEA 
7. Special Silinr Adluatacnti 
Centrally, special aalary adjuatments are only approvtd by DHSH when 
an inequity can clearly be demonetrated. Uaually a significant 
ertnt happens or circumstances occur which cauaes the Inequity* 
Some examples are: 
1. frobationary employees MTB allowed a probationary BMIMTY 
Increase which may move the* to an equal or hisher salary levtl 
than othtr more atnior employeee in the ease Job classification* 
2. Hew hire employees are hired at a salary rate equal to or above 
those of current employees, in the same Job claaalflcatlon. 
3. Imployees are not; given the sane percent Increase when 
proawted or reclassified, when they are in the saae Job 
classification. 
4. Adminietrative or clerical errors In personnel actions In the 
area of salary amounts, effective dates, etc. 
3. Preferential treatment of one eaployee over another employee. 
Circumstances which do not; justify a special aalary adjustment 
1. Employees are paid different salary rates in the aame 
classification pay range because of different hire datea, 
performance ratings, and tenors* 
2. Outstanding or exceptional Job performance. 
3. Catch-up pay increases because of salary freeze years. 
4. Different levels of educational attainments in same Job 
classification. 
5. Any performance factore used for Justification. 
6. Surplus funds available to help employees. 
7. A supervisor who is paid less than a eubordinata employee. 
t. Increeses In duties and responsibilities. 
All requests for special sslary adjustments, or equity adjustments should 
bs made in writing according to the above Justifications. 
ERHrdc 
cci Central Files * Compensation 
D««n v / n c 
W0O& THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter Of: 
JOHN H. JONES, 
Grievant and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY, 
Agency and Appellant. 
DECISION 
AND 
ORDER 
Case Nos. 10 CSRB/H.O. 137 (Step 5) 
4 CSRB 38 (Step 6) 
The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level 
review of the above-captioned case on May 28, 1992. The following Board members were 
present at the hearing for consideration of oral argument and deliberation: Chairman 
Bruce T. Jones, Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L. Trujillo. John H. Jones 
(Agent Jones and Grievant) was present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at 
Law, on behalf of the Utah Public Employees' Association (UPEA). The Department of 
Public Safety (Department and DPS) was represented by Lin D. Miller, Jr., Personnel 
Manager for the Department. A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the oral 
argument during this proceeding, which is commonly referred to as a Step 6 appeal hearing 
under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code Unannotated, (1991 Supplement), 
§67-19a-101 etseq. 
I. AUTHORITY 
The Board's authority is found at §§67-19a-101 through -407 of the Utah statutes. 
The CSRB's regulatory provisions or administrative rules are published in the Utah 
Administrative Code at R137-1-11 etseq. (1992), and in the Board's Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Manual (1989 edition). 
This case has proceeded properly through the State • s grievance procedures, and the 
Board has assumed jurisdiction over the Department's appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or 
Board-level review constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under the 
codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, pursuant to §67-19a-202(l)(a), and -407, as well 
as constituting a final agency action under §63-46b-14 of the Utali Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA). Following oral argument, the Board closed the record and entered into 
deliberation and decision-making. 
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Replies to Grievance at Steps 2 and 3 
On June 7, 1991, Agent Jones submitted his written statement of grievance to his 
immediate supervisor, Captain Stuart Smith, bureau chief of the UDI's Narcotics 
Enforcement Bureau. Captain Smith acknowledged that the other staff recently assigned 
to the UDI were to receive salary adjustments (i.e., pay increases) effective July 1, 1990. 
However, the bureau chief wrote to Grievant that Grievant had "signed a letter stating you 
agree to no 5% salary adjustment." The captain also stated that he did not know how 
Agent Jones "fit into this new pay plan in respect to the other agents you referfred] to in 
your grievance"; albeit, Captain Smith stated a willingness to review Grievant' s salary status 
as of July 1,1991, "If you still feel you have a pay inequity, I will be happy to review it with 
you at that time." Nevertheless, Bureau Chief Smith denied Agent Jones' grievance in the 
Step 2 reply. 
Next, Grievant advanced his salary complaint to his division director at Step 3. UDI 
Division Director Fred Schwendiman offered Jones the following explanation as to why the 
latter had not received a salary increase upon transferring into the UDI in late summer, 
1990: 
It is my understanding that when you transferred to UDI some 
time ago into the Auto Theft Program that you were given a 
5% salary adjustment as part of the career mobility assignment. 
When you subsequently were returned to duty with the Utah 
Highway Patrol, your salary was not changed and you were 
allowed to continue with the increase you had [rv ;ved] while 
in UDI. When you then were again re-assigned : » UDI, the 
decision was that it would be inappropriate to adt' .: other 5% 
for the new career mobility assignment. 
UDI Director Schwendiman concluded that to give Grievant miv. additional 5% and back 
pay as requested in [Jones'] grievance would be inappropriate .mil something I could not 
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support." Hence, Schwendiman denied Jones • grievance at Step 3 of the grievance 
procedures. 
P, Tfre First Administrative Hearing and Decision, or Phase I 
Upon advancing his grievance to the Step 4 or department head level, Grievant was 
offered an administrative hearing, which occurred on July 30, 1991- The trier of fact was 
the Departments administrative law judge (AU). This first administrative hearing at the 
departmental level later became known as "Phase I," due to a second proceeding later on. 
The ALJ's Phase I decision stated UDIfs position for denying Agent Jones grievance: 
The Division admitted that the seven other Troopers received 
the five percent salary adjustment when they accepted their 
career mobility transfers [into the Division of Investigations]. 
The Division argued that Jones did not receive the five percent 
salary adjustment because he had received a nine percent salary 
adjustment in 1984 when he moved into a temporary dual 
assignment involving the Governor • s Protective Services Unit 
and the UHP Vehicle Theft Program. The Division contended 
that to give Jones a five percent increase in 1990 in addition to 
his nine percent increase in 1984 would be excessive and would 
create internal problems with other employees. 
Furthermore, the Division argued that it was untimely for Jones to raise his grievance 
on June 7, 1991, when he had already accepted a career mobility transfer into the UDI on 
September 5, 1990.2 The ALT agreed with the UDI's untimeliness argument and 
concluded his Phase I decision by recommending that the department head should dismiss 
the grievance "for the reason that it was not pursued in a timely fashion." Importantly, the 
ALJ acknowledged that Agent Jones* grievance may have been filed timely at Step 1 
(verbal discussion with the immediate supervisor), but that Grievant had failed to process 
it in a timely fashion thereafter. As this administrative hearing decision was a 
"Recommended Step 4 Decision," the matter was next considered by Commissioner 
D. Douglas Bodrero, the DPS department head. 
Commissioner Bodrero declined to rule on Agent Jones • grievance from the narrowly 
technical ground that the grievance had not been timely advanced and processed. Instead, 
the commissioner wrote that he was taking a broader perspective of Agent Jones' informal 
problem solving efforts. As the commissioner stated in his August 21, 1991 Step 4 reply: 
[I]t has been the position of this administration that oftentimes 
avenues are available to resolve differences short of the official 
grievance process. The fact that you pursued these avenues 
prior to initiating an official grievance do[es] not compel me to 
rule against you because of this delay. 
Thereupon, the Commissioner remanded the case to the ALJ for the latter, "to gather 
evidence in order to make a recommendation to me concerning this matter." Essentially, 
Commissioner Bodrero expressed his preference to make a decision based upon the merits, 
issues and facts of the case, and not upon "a technicality as to when the grievance was 
initiated." Hence, any further allegations of untimeliness in either the filing of this 
grievance or its processing were effectively waived by the DPS commissioner himself* 
C. The Second Departmental Hearing and Decision, or Phase II 
Upon remand, the Department • s ALI met with both parties• representatives on 
September 11, 1991, at which time the representatives received a list of eight questions to 
be answered and returned to the ALJ. After receiving each party • s replies, the ALJ issued 
his Phase II Recommended Decision on October31, 1991. Therein, the AU's Phase II 
Recommended Step 4 Decision reached an ultimate decision, as follows: 
It is respectfully recommended that Agent Jones • grievance be 
denied for the reason that the Division had a valid reason for 
denying him the five percent salary adjustment when he 
accepted the career mobility assignment to UDI on 
September 5, 1990. However, it is also recommended that the 
Department give Agent Jones the option of rescinding the 
career mobility agreement with UDI and allow him to return to 
his prior field assignment in the Utah Highway Patrol. 
The basis upon which the Department• s AU denied Agent Jones • grievance for a five 
percent pay increase upon appointment to the UDI was that the Division' s representative 
had averred that Grievant's assignment to Executive Protection in 1984 had been a 
temporary assignment, that it had been for only five months,3 and that Grievant was the 
only person of 27 individuals assigned, since July 1,1969, to have been assigned to Executive 
Protection on a "temporary" basis. Concluded the AU: 
Thus, the notion that the officers who worked in the Governor • s Protective 
Services Unit retained their nine percent salary adjustments even after leaving 
the Unit is a myth. This is particularly true in the case of officers who served 
there less than 18 months. 
In his Phase II decision, the Department's ALJ recommended that the DPS 
Commissioner should deny Agent Jones• a five percent salary increase for his assignment 
to the UDI in 1990, but that Jones should again be given the alternative of rescinding his 
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career mobility agreement with the UDI and be allowed to return to the UHP as a field 
trooper, if he chose, 
D. The Step 5/Evidentiarv Proceeding and Decision 
On January 16, 1992, the CSRB hearing officer conducted an evidentiary hearing at 
the Step 5 level of the State Employees • Grievance and Appeal Procedures. This 
proceeding is a new hearing for the record, conducted de novo, with both parties being 
granted full administrative due process. The Board • s hearing officer is required to give 
"latitude and consideration" to an agency • s prior decision when the latter is supported by 
findings of fact based upon the evidence adduced below.4 Most importantly, the CSRB's 
factfinder is not required to give any deference to the Department • s factual findings where 
the departmental hearings were not conducted as formal adjudications under the UAPA (see 
Utah Code Unannotated, £63-46b-l(2)(e)). 
The Step 5/evidentiary determination issued on February 6, 1992, reached an 
ultimate conclusion favoring Grievant: that Agent Jones had sufficiently met his burden of 
proof with substantial evidence; that he was entitled to prevail in his June 7, 1991, 
grievance; and that he should be awarded back pay retroactive to his appointment date as 
a Law Enforcement Agent I. 
One matter requires preliminary attention and resolution before analyzing the factual 
findings and legal conclusions from the Step 5 proceeding below. Even with Commissioner 
Bodrero's August 21, 1991 letter stating that he would decide this case on its merits, the 
Departmentf s representative has advanced an untimeliness claim at both the Step 5 and 
Step 6 proceedings. Therefore, after setting forth the issues below, we must consider the 
timeliness controversy due to its jurisdictional nature. 
III. ISSUES 
A. Agent Jones' Statement of Grievance and Remedy. 
Agent Jones filed a statement of grievance on June 7, 1991. Therein, Grievant 
claimed that he had been denied a five percent salary increase upon his being voluntarily 
transferred through a career exchange program5 from the position of trooper in the Utah 
Highway Patrol (UHP) into the Department's Utah Division of Investigations (UDI) as a 
Law Enforcement Agent I, effective September 5, 1990. Agent Jones averred that he had 
been promised a five percent pay adjustment along with seven other UHP troopers who had 
also been assigned to UDI • s Narcotics Enforcement Bureau under the same career mobility 
program. Each of the other seven troopers received a four to five percent pay increase6 
upon assignment to the UDI, except Agent Jones. The UDI director, Fred C. Schwendiman, 
stated to Agent Jones that the reason he was not being given the special five percent pay 
adjustment along with the new career mobility assignment was that Jones had previously 
been granted a similar five percent salary increase for a prior transfer into the UDIf s Auto 
Theft Program 'some time ago." (Grievant Exhibit 4.) 
Grievant's remedy to his pay inequity complaint was that he be given a five percent 
salary adjustment retroactive to August 18,1990, or at least that he be given a pay increase 
equal to that awarded to each of the other seven UHP troopers who had received the same 
career mobility assignment of Law Enforcement Agent I as had Jones. 
B. Issues Adjudicated at the Step 5/Evidentiarv Proceeding 
The issues under adjudication at the Step 5 hearing were set forth in the notice of 
hearing, as follows: 
1. Is the Grievant entitled to prevail on his June 7, 1991 salary 
grievance? 
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? 
The CSRB hearing officer ruled in favor of the Grievant. The Board • s trier of fact 
concluded that, "[t]here is more than substantial evidence to support the Grievant • s case; 
and therefore, he is entitled to prevail in his grievance of June 7,1991." Consequently, the 
CSRB hearing officer directed the Department *to retroactively apply the five percent pay 
increase to the Grievant • s Grade 23 pay as of the first pay period subsequent to the date 
of his appointment as a Law Enforcement Agent I." 
C. The Board * s Standards of Review 
R137-1-21 D sets forth the Board's scope of review and its standards of review as 
follows: 
Standards of Review The boardf s decision shall be based upon 
the following: 
1. The board's appellate decisions shall be supported by 
credible substantial evidence. 
2. The board's standards of review consist of determining: 
(a) whether the hearing officer• s evidentiary decision was 
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether that decision is 
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal; 
_*_ 
and (c) whether the hearing officer's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are correct and accurate based upon the 
evidence in the record. 
D. Burden of Proof 
The Department is the party appealing the Step 5/evidentiary decision to \ Board 
at Step 6, and therefore shoulders the burden of proof based upon the CSRBf s ab -stated 
standards of review. DPS claims that Grievant failed to meet his burden c ostantial 
evidence at the Step 5 proceeding; that the CSRB hearing officer failed to make inclusions 
of law as required by statute and rule; that the CSRB hearing officer made errors in factual 
findings numbers 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 23; that the evidentiary trier made opinions incorrectly 
labeled as conclusions of law; and that the hearing officer erred in his conclusions of law 
at numbers 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18 and 19. We review first the correctness of the factual 
findings and their reasonableness. Next, the Board may either accept and adopt the hearing 
officer• s factual findings, correct those findings, or enter its own findings. Then we review 
the Step 5 record as a whole with no deference to determine whether the hearing officer 
correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes. Finally, we examine the Step 5 
decision in relation to the Department • s decision and in light of the hearing officerf s 
ultimate conclusion and decision, and his application of any policies, rules, and statutes 
affecting this grievance. 
IV. TIMELINESS CHALLENGE 
In his August 21, 1991 letter to Agent Jones, Commissioner Bodrero noted that the 
departmental AU had recommended that this grievance should "be dismissed on the basis 
that it was not pursued in a timely fashion" (Agency Exhibit 7). Nevertheless, the 
department head observed that Agent Jc tes had pursued his grievance through unofficial 
avenues short of the official grievance process. By Grievant having pursued his complaint 
through unofficial, problem-solving avenues, Commissioner Bodrero stated that he would 
not rule against Jones because of delay in the processing of this grievance. Thereupon, the 
department head remanded Jones• grievance to the ALJ to have him: 
reconvene the departmental hearing in order to gather further 
evidence making a recommendation to the commission of the 
grievance' s merits. It is my desire to resolve this issue based 
on fairness supported by facts, not on a technicality as to when 
the grievance was initiated. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Consonant with Commissioner Bodrero's instruction above, the Department's A U 
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conducted a second hearing, in which the merits of the grievance were considered and ruled 
upon, with the timeliness issue having been put aside or mooted. The ALI's 
•Recommended Step 4 Decision (Phase II)" was issued on October 31, 1991. The 
departmental factfinder recommended to the department head that Jones' grievance be 
denied "for the reason that the Division had a valid reason for denying him the five percent 
salary adjustment when he accepted the career mobility assignment to UDI on September 5, 
1990." On November 5, 1991, Commissioner Bodrero wrote to Grievant that his salary 
adjustment request was being denied, but that Jones could rescind his career mobility 
transfer to the UDI, if he wished. 
Grievant's UPEA representative advanced the grievance to Step 5. Thereupon, the 
Department's representative submitted a "Request For Administrative Review Pursuant 
to §67-19a-403," which was a further attempt to reassert the same timeliness issue previously 
settled in favor of the Grievant by the DPS commissioner. In response, the CSRB 
administrator denied the Department's attempt to raise anew the previously settled 
timeliness question which now constituted a stale challenge to the allegation of Grievant' s 
untimely status.7 
The Department' s representative further raised the timeliness issue at Step 5, this 
time directly with the CSRB hearing officer (T. 5-6, 77-78, 81-82, 94). On this issue the 
CSRB hearing officer made a specific finding in his Finding of Fact number 30. The 
evidentiary trier quoted from Commissioner Bodrero's August 21, 1991 letter (Agency 
Exhibit 7), wherein the latter wrote that due to Grievant' s dependence on informal avenues 
of problem-solving, the commissioner had decided he would not rule against Agent Jones 
because of any time delay. Stated the CSRB trier of fact: "Commissioner Bodrero then 
remanded the case to the ALJ for consideration on the basis of 'fairness supported by 
facts,' rather than a technicality as to timeliness." In Conclusion of Law number 3, the 
CSRB hearing officer concluded in part: "On the issue of timeliness, which the Agency 
raised again in the course of this hearing, the disallowance of that issue by Commissioner 
Bodrero, ordering the grievance to be reheard on the basis of its merits, makes that question 
moot. There is no reason to believe that Commissioner Bodrero did not have the authority 
to do so." Moreover, the hearing officer cited to the department head's reliance on the 
Department's standing practice of settling grievances informally, by which the "past 
practice" principle was invoked in this instance. 
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Following the CSRB • s Step 5 evidentiary proceeding and decision, the Department • s 
representative has again raised the timeliness question that should have been disposed of 
conclusively at Steps 4 and 5. In the Departmentf s JBlifif to the Board, at pages 8-9, the 
Department argues that because the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing in the State's grievance 
procedure is a de novo proceeding, an untimeliness assertion may again be applied in an 
effort to defeat the Step 5 Decision's determination. 
We now conclude with finality that as a matter of law the Public Safety 
commissioner's August 21,1991 letter constitutes a valid waiver of any and all untimeliness 
claims and defenses on the part of the Department (see Agency Exhibit 7). That letter 
constitutes an express relinquishment of the legal right to invoke any procedural or 
jurisdictional claims to any questionable timeliness acts on Agent Jones' part anent this 
grievance. An essential component of a valid and legal waiver is the element of 
unconditional voluntariness. Agency Exhibit 7 contains this core requirement; that exhibit 
contains a full and unconditional expression of voluntariness. Hence, the commissioner's 
August 21 letter is dispositive to any question of timeliness in this grievance matter; he 
knowingly, deliberately and intelligently waived the timeliness issue in futurity. There is no 
showing that any of Commissioner Bodrero' s subordinates have authority to overturn his 
decisions with respect to grievances. By Utah law, a department head's decision is final at 
the departmental or Step 4 level of the grievance procedures (§67-19a-402(4)(c)). 
V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
John Jones was hired by the Department of Public Safety on April 16, 1973, and 
began serving as a UHP trooper (T.13). Trooper Jones was appointed to the position of the 
UHP's Auto Theft Coordinator (Coordinator) sometime during May or June 1984, while 
still holding the rank of Trooper II (T. 36,37, 38-39). This appointment was a special UHP 
Headquarters assignment. Grievant's special appointment was then interrupted shortly 
afterwards when he was transferred on August 4, 1984, through a career mobility 
assignment, to the Executive Protection Detail (aka Governor • s Security). Grievant had 
not received any pay increase for his special assignment to the Coordinator position, but he 
did receive a nine percent salary increase upon being transferred to Governor' s Security 
(Grievant Exhibit 1). 
Agent Jones served in Executive Protection until about October 15,1984, depending 
upon whether Jones' or his former supervisor's version is accepted (T. 71-73)- The 
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Departments Personnel Action Form shows Jones' transition to Executive Protection as 
a Temporary assignment until 12/31/84" (Agency Exhibit 4). Nevertheless, Grievant 
stated that he was not aware of nor informed about the temporary nature of this assignment 
during his term of service with Executive Protection (T. 83-84). The UHP superintendent's 
July 27, 1984 letter which appointed Jones stated only that, "In the event you should leave 
this new assignment, your pay will be adjusted to the position, grade and step level you 
would have attained had you not served in Executive Protection." A computer generated 
"salary action history" form of recent origin shows Jones' salary increased by nine percent 
from $12.12 to $13.21 effective August 4, 1984, although he remained on the Trooper II pay 
grade 21 level (Grievant Exhibit 1). According to the official paperwork, Grievant was not 
transferred out of Governor's Security until July 1, 1985, (Grievant Exhibit 1) although in 
reality his transfer occurred the previous October. 
When Grievant left the Executive Protection Detail in mid or late October 1984, 
management directed his return to UHP Headquarters in continuation of his prior special 
assignment, that of Auto Theft Coordinator. The action history does not show an exact date 
of his return to Headquarters as Coordinator. Grievant' s salary was neither reduced nor 
changed upon his reassignment to Headquarters in October 1984 (T. 26), nor in later 
months. Importantly, Jones' nine percent pay increase was retained upon his leaving 
Executive Protection, and was never taken from him. A Department witness testified that 
Grievant was permitted to retain his nine percent salary adjustment because Jones had 
"returned to a position that warranted the additional increase in money, so rather than take 
it away from him they let him keep that increase." (T. 58). 
Agent Jones remained in his Coordinator assignment for the next three years, which 
lasted from October 1984 through December 1987 (T. 26). Jones' Coordinator assignment 
ended in December 1987, when that program was phased out (T. 38). 
Grievant's next assignment originated through a letter dated December 18, 1987, in 
which the UHP superintendent informed Trooper Jones that he was being reassigned 
effective December 26, 1987, to the Department's Medicaid Fraud Bureau, through an 
interdivisional transfer (T. 26-27, 31, 38-39; Agency Exhibit 1; Grievant Exhibit 6). Jones» 
new assignment was effectuated through a career mobility agreement (a written contract), 
signed later on January 26, 1988 (Grievant Exhibit 6). This agreement placed Grievant in 
the Department' s Investigations Division as a Fraud Medicaid Bureau Investigator (T. 39). 
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The agreement stated that Jones• temporary assignment to the Medicaid Fraud Bureau as 
an Investigator would expire December 31, 1989, unless rescinded sooner. Agent Jones 
retained his rank of UHP Trooper II, at salary grade 21, while serving as an Investigator. 
(T. 40, Grievant Exhibit 1). There was no change in either Jonesf salary grade or pay rate 
during this temporary duty with the Medicaid Fraud Bureau (Agency Exhibit 1; Grievant 
Exhibit 6). Both parties acknowledge that Jones retained the nine percent salary increase 
that he had received since August 1984 upon his temporary assignment to Executive 
Protection* 
In February 1988, however, Grievant was again reassigned by management: this time 
from the Medicaid Fraud Bureau to the Special Investigations Bureau, both within the UDI 
(T. 42-43). Although the salary action history document on Agent Jones does not show the 
exact date of his being reassigned back to field trooper status with the UHP, he placed the 
period as some time during July or August of 1988 (T. 43). The Department' s salary action 
history omits this personnel move. Grievant performed field trooper duties for the next two 
years during which time his salary was not decreased even though he was no longer 
performing any special assignments for the first time since May or June 1984. In sum, 
Grievant had been serving on special assignments, career mobility assignments, and 
temporary duty assignments from May/June 1984 through August 1988, when he returned 
after a more than four year hiatus to UHP field trooper status. Agent Jones then served 
as a UHP trooper out of the Murray office until selected for the UDI Law Enforcement 
Agent I position during August/September 1990 (T. 44-45). 
In May 1990, the Departments UDI internally advertized and recruited for eight 
Law Enforcement Agent I positions. These eight i gent I positions with UDI were 
announced as being available to current DPS employees through a two year career mobility 
assignment/transfer. Ultimately, all eight UDI Agent I positions were filled by the selection 
of UHP troopers (T. 14). All eight troopers were initially told that they would receive pay 
increases of four to five percent for the job change (T.16; Grievant Exhibit 3). Grievant, 
who was one of the eight UHP troopers selected for a UDI Law Enforcement Agent I 
position, expected and was told initially by Captain Wendell that he would receive a five 
percent pay adjustment. All the selected troopers, except for Agent Jones, received a 4-5 
percent salary increase as part of their career mobility assignment with UDI's Narcotics 
Enforcement Bureau. 
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Effective August 18, 1990, Grievant was reclassified from Highway Patrol Trooper 
IIf at pay grade 21, to Law Enforcement Agent I, at pay grade 23 (Grievant Exhibit 1). In 
contradiction, however, the UHP superintendent released Grievant from his UHP status and 
directed him to a UDI training assignment effective September 10, 1990. (Agency 
Exhibit 3.) Concomitantly, an executed but undated Career Mobility Agreement transferred 
Jones from the UHP Division to the Investigations Division (Agency Exhibit 2), In further 
contradiction, the salary action history shows Grievant being transferred on July 1, 1990, 
presumably from the UHP, and being reclassified on August 18, 1990, as a Law 
Enforcement Agent I. Essentially, Agent Jones received a pay grade advancement from 
grade 21 to 23 but without any accompanying salary increase, which salary adjustment had 
been granted to the other seven troopers/agents for the same assignment. 
Initially, the justification relied upon by the Department• s officials to withhold from 
Jones' a five percent pay increase was that set forth in a letter dated August 22, 1990, by 
UHP Lieutenant Colonel Gary E. Gunrud to UDI director Fred C. Schwendiman which 
stated: 
In the interest of fairness and equity, I recommend that 
Troopier Jones not be given the five percent increase since he 
has been making sergeants [sic] wages ever since serving as the 
Auto Theft Coordinator for the Patrol (Grievant Exhibit 3). 
Subsequently, Agent Jones and UDI Director Schwendiman mutually signed a career 
mobility agreement pertaining to the UDI Agent I position. The document offered into the 
record does not contain an authorized date of execution (Agency Exhibit 2). This written 
agreement was to be in effect "until September 1, 1992[,] unless sooner rescinded." 
UDI Director Schwendiman later offered another view as to why Agent Jones was 
not given a five percent salary increase like the other seven troopers who were also 
appointed to fill the Narcotics Enforcement Bureau • s Agent I positions. In his June 24, 
1991 Step 3 reply to Agent Jones1 grievance, Director Schwendiman stated: 
It is my understanding that when you transferred to UDI some 
time ago into the Auto Theft Program that you were given a 
5% salary adjustment. When y< < ^ ibsequently returned to duty 
with the Utah Highway Patrol, ymr salary was not changed and 
you were allowed to continue \tiih the increase you had while 
in UDI. When you then were again re-assigned to UDI, the 
decision was that it would be inappropriate to add another 5% 
for the new career mobility assignment (Grievant Exhibit 4). 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
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Yet another justification was argued by the Department at the evidentiary/Step 5 
hearing for not offering Jones • a salary increase at the beginning his two-year stint with the 
Narcotics Enforcement Bureau. The Department maintained that Jones should have had 
his salary reduced five percent when Grievant left UDI 's Fraud Medicaid and retu; zd to 
field trooper duties in 1988 (T. 91). The Department now claimed that it was rem s and 
in error not to have reduced Jones • salary at that time. This error was described as the 
Department's "slip through the crack/ its "failfure] to take the money away," "an 
oversight," "our fault that it wasn' t taken away when it should have been taken away." 
(T. 92, passim.) Thus, in response to Agent Jones1 grievance, the Department claims to 
have acted fairly to both Jones and the other seven troopers/agents by not granting Agent 
Jones the same five percent pay increase that had been granted to the other seven similarly 
situated troopers/agents8 during the August-September 1990 period (T.91). The action 
history (Grievant Exhibit 1) does not show that Jones was ever given a five percent pay 
increase especially for the Coordinator position, but he was granted nine percent for 
commencing duty with Executive Protection in August 1984. That nine percent was not 
taken away or reduced by four percent for his retention of even five percent for the special 
assignment as Coordinator. The Department• s position was that the special assignment 
position of Coordinator warranted a five percent pay increase referred to as "temporary 
sergeant's pay"9 (Agency Exhibits 3 and 5). At hearing, the Department argued that 
Jones' salary should have been reduced [whether by nine, five or four percent is unstated 
and unclear] upon his returning to field trooper duties in July/August 1988 (T.91-92; 
Grievant Exhibit 4). 
VII. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
The Department posits that because Agent Jones failed to submit any documentary 
evidence showing that he was entitled to a special salary adjustment, therefore, Jones was 
not inappropriately denied a special salary adjustment. Additionally, the Department avers 
that Jones did not even call any witnesses to support his case. 
By law, the burden of proof is the substantial evidence standard (Utah Code 
Unannotated, £67-19a-406(2)(c)). In a salary grievance, such as this matter, the burden of 
proof is upon the grievant (Utah Code Unannotated, £67-19a-406(2)(b)). A paramount legal 
authority defines substantial evidence as applicable to agency administrative proceedings, 
as follows: 
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Under the substantial evidence rule, as applied in 
administrative proceedings; all evidence is competent and may 
be considered, regardless of its source and nature, if it is the 
kind of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion. In other words, the competency of 
evidence for purposes of administrative agency adjudicatory 
proceedings is made to rest upon the logical persuasiveness of 
such evidence to the reasonable mind in using it to support a 
conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla and means such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion. Chrysler Corp. v. U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency. C.A.. 631 F.21d 865.890.203 
U.S.App.D.C. 283. quoted from Black's Law Dictionary, sixth 
edition, p. 1428. 
First we review to determine whether the record below contains sufficient, credible 
evidence which a reasonable mind would accept to draw a conclusion therefrom. Next, we 
review to ascertain whetherthe record contains more than a mere scintilla to support the 
hearing officer• s ultimate conclusion. 
In his Conclusion of Law number 1, the hearing officer correctly placed the burden 
of proof upon Grievant, and properly set the evidentiary standard at the substantial evidence 
level. DPS states that Grievant called no witnesses, other than himself, although Grievant 
testified for 43 1/2 pages out of 65 1/2 total pages of testimony. The Department' s two 
witnesses testified for a total of 22 pages in the transcript. Grievant submitted seven 
exhibits, the Agency also submitted seven exhibits, and one joint exhibit was filed. The total 
exhibits numbered 15 documents. The record testimony and exhibits constituted more than 
a sufficiency for substantial evidence. 
The Step 5 record shows that the hearing officer properly developed "a clear and 
complete record," received "relevant evidence," and admitted evidence that had "a 
reasonable and probative value," as required in the CSRB' s rules (R137-1-20 A. 1, 6). As 
a matter of law we conclude that the combined testimony and documentary records are 
more than sufficient to constitute credible substantial evidence, which satisfies the statutory 
requirement (§67-19a-406(2)(c). 
The hearing officer considered, analyzed and wo <I the testimonial and 
documentary evidence before him. He found it sufficient for Uic Grievant to meet his 
burden of proof, and we affirm the adequacy of the Grievant's evidence. The hearing 
officer relied upon the entire record of the Step 5 proceeding, meaning that he took into 
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account both the Grievant • s and the Department • s evidence. The factfinder ultimately 
concluded that he had found "more than substantial evidence to support Grievant fs 
case " (Step 5 Decision, p. 12). Applying the Board1 s appellate standard at 
R137-1-21 D. 1, we hold the CSRB hearing officer made reasonable and rational factual 
findings. The Step 5 Decision is found to be warranted by the facts and circumstances in 
accordance with the substantial evidence standard. The findings by a factfinder must be 
entitled to a presumption of correctness. The Department has not mustered sufficient 
justification to overturn that presumption on appeal. Overall, there is sufficient credible 
substantial evidence that a reasonable mind would accept to support the Step 5 Decision, 
even though other reasonable minds may differ with the ultimate decision. 
VIIL STEP 5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Department faults the Step 5 Conclusions of Law. This challenge is directed to 
the point that only four (or possibly five) conclusions are in reference to any of the State! s 
human resource management rules. Except for conclusions 8, 13, and 19 (and possibly 
number 16 by inference) referring to R468-2-5(2)(f), the Department believes all other 
conclusions are defective due to not citing a particular administrative rule (Brief, pp. 5-6). 
Conclusions Of law are not merely recitings of rules and statutes. Legal conclusions 
include propositions that are made after the factfinding process occurs. We agree with the 
Grievant !s statement that written opinions (i.e., propositions) are acceptable forms of 
conclusions of law, and that while the correctness of any conclusion may be attacked, that 
the process per se is beyond challenge. 
After examining the Step 5 Decision's Conclusions of Law, we hold that the CSRB 
hearing officer correctly placed the burden of proof on the Grievant (§67-19a-406(2)(b)), 
correctly applied the substantial evidence standard (§67-19a-406(2)(c)), correctly concluded 
that the department head waived the timeliness issues arising at Step 4, and reasonably and 
rationally ruled on the merits of Agent Jones• grievance. Admittedly, the trier of fact found 
several pieces of information to be "unclear" based on the adduced testimony and 
documentary evidence that he considered. Our scrutiny of the documentary record and 
testimony confirms that several aspects pertaining to Grievantf s past salary history are not 
clear. The Board further holds that the evidentiary/Step 5 decision is legally supportable 
based on the evidence in the record as a whole. 
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DC APPELLATE CONCLUSIONS 
Based upon the evidentiary/Step 5 Findings of Fact and the evidence in the record 
as a whole, this administrative tribunal makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. The department head at Step 4 waived all issues regarding timeliness in both the 
filing and processing of this grievance. That issue became moot at Step 4. 
2. The Board enters the same factual findings as those made by the CSRB hearing 
officer, and hereby adopts those evidentiary/Step 5 Findings of Fact as its own. 
3. The evidentiary/Step 5 Findings of Fact are supported by credible substantial 
evidence in the record. There is sufficient substantial evidence to support the hearing 
officers findings, conclusions, and ultimate decision, 
4. The Department did not have a legally valid reason to preclude Agent Jones from 
receiving his five percent special adjustment for serving in the UDI, when all the facts and 
circumstances are considered. 
5. The Board concludes as a matter of law that the Department made an erroneous 
decision that precluded a special pay increase for Agent Jones. The Department is 
obligated to treat all similarly situated employees alike, unless there is a reasonable or 
rational purpose in making an exception. In the instant case, no rules or statutes precluded 
Agent Jones from receiving the special pay adjustment that was granted to the other seven 
selected troopers for UDI service, 
6. The Department • s officials did not properly communicate with Agent Jones that 
it intended him not to continue receiving his nine percent pay increase granted in 1984, and 
which he continued to receive after August 1988, even after all of his series of special 
assignments ended. The Department could have corrected its acknowledged error 
(T. 11, 92-93) regarding Grievant's salary rate during or within a reasonable time after 
August 1988. Failure to correct Jones • salary proximate to the time it could or should have 
been corrected forfeited the Departmentf s discretion to come back two years later and take 
it away by not granting the same increase given to the seven other similarly situated 
employees. DHRM's R468-2-3 (1990) bestows upon agencies the ability and authority to 
correct administrative errors (as noted by the hearing officer); however, this rule may not 
be enforced arbitrarily to correct errors that could have or sh<» < I have been corrected years 
earlier. It would be an arbitrary act to attempt to correct • / matters two years, five 
years, or 12 years after the fact. Administrative errors, incl. : Grievant's salary rate, 
_ K 
must be corrected within a reasonable time. Two years after the fact is not a reasonable 
exercise of managerial discretion. 
7. This grievance is not about a situation of mutual mistake. As the Department 
failed to communicate with the Grievant regarding its error in 1988, it waived any ability 
to take away salary from Agent Jones in 1990 even by not granting him the five percent 
received by the other seven troopers/agents. We conclude that the Department has 
discretion to give salary increases or not; however, that discretion must be exercised within 
reasonable bounds. There has to be a reasonable basis for salary decisions. The facts of 
this case do not comport with a reasonable basis. Jones should have received his pay 
increase in 1990 for the same appointment given to the other seven troopers. With 
discretion comes responsibility. In the instant fact setting, the Department has forfeited the 
right to withhold Jones • pay increase by basing its actions upon incidents that occurred well 
over two years previously, and to some extent even six years earlier. 
8. Grievant was treated in an impermissible manner that constitutes disparate (i.e., 
completely dissimilar) treatment. All eight UHP troopers, including Grievant, were 
advanced from pay Grade 21 to pay Grade 23. Trooper John Grabner (and by inference 
the other six troopers) was advanced from Grade 21 to 23 under the aegis of a "career 
mobility" move and thus received a special pay adjustment (Grievant Exhibit 2). Grievant, 
in contrast, was advanced from Grade 21 to 23 but not given the pay increase awarded to 
the other seven troopers, and the personnel action noted was that of "reclassification." By 
stating a "reclassification," the Department is treating Agent Jones is a dissimilar fashion 
when he was a part of the same similarly situated group of UHP troopers. The pretext of 
"reclassification" is an arbitrary exercise of authority, in this instance. It is further 
concluded that the appellation of "reclassification" to Agent Jones • career mobility move 
(Grievant Exhibit 6) is entirely inappropriate, and constitutes an artificial attempt to 
segregate him from his similarly situated peer group. 
9. On its face, this salary difference in the treatment accorded Jones and the seven 
other similarly situated troopers/agents constitutes an impermissible, unfair employment 
practice within the State• s civil service system. Jones was not treated fairly nor equitably 
vis-a-vis the other troopers/agents when he was advanced to Grade 23 without receiving the 
pay rate increase awarded to his seven UHP peers. 
10. The Board concludes that the evidentiary/Step 5 decision is reasonable and 
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rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and the correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes applicable to this grievance- The Department's appeal is 
denied. 
X. DECISION 
The Department's appeal to the appellate/Step 6 level is denied. Agent Jones is 
entitled to the remedy award by the Step 5 Decision. It is so ordered. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS. 
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman 
Jean M. Bishop, Member 
David M. Hilbig, Member 
Jose L. Trujillo, Member 
DATED this2T^day of July 1992. 
J3nic -^4-7-dones 
Chairnu 
Career Service^Revte^ Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code 
Unannotated §63-46b-13. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated 
§63-46b-14. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Beginning in January 1992, the Utah Division of Administrative Rulemaking renum* cd the CSRB's agcr 
rulemaking number from R140 to R137. Currently the CSRB is still using its 1989 edi Manual of Gricvar 
Procedures which applies the R140 number. I fowever, the 1992 edition of the Utah Adi strativc Code has be 
issued in April 1992, and therefore we shall hereinafter use the R137 designation wh s found in the newi 
code set. 
2. In the ALTs Phase I Finding of Facts, factual findings Nos. 5 through 15 treat the r ter of Jones' long del 
in filing his salary adjustment grievance. Given the later Step 4 decision and the subsequent sequence of even 
it is not pertinent to treat this aspect in detail in the main body of this Step 6 Decision. 
3. The Division/Department representative stated that Agent Jones had served in Executive Protection for fi 
months, while Grievant himself testified that the lime period was about three and one-half months. 
4. Effective December 16, 1991, the CSRB changed the wording of R137-1-20 C. from "latitude and deferenc 
to "latitude and consideration." See Utah Admin. Code R137-1-20 C. (1992 Supp.) 
5. The Human Resource Management Rules (July 1,1990 cd.) published by the Department of Human Resour 
Management (DHRM) at R468-5-15.(6) recognize two types of career exchange programs. The career exchanj 
program applicable to Agent Jones' grievance is defined as follows: 
(6)(a) Career mobility involves employee movement from one job to another, 
which shall require a written contract between the employee and the 
appropriate department officials. 
6. Both of the Step 4 or departmental level decisions by the DPS ALI stated that the seven other troopers/agen 
received a five percent increase. In contrast, though, the Department's representative at the Step 5 hearii 
stipulated that all of the other seven troopers/agents received "a four to five percent salary adjustment" (T. 16 
However, each connection between Jones' name and the anticipated salary adjustment was always expressed 
terms of being a five percent increase. This Step 6 Decision associates Jones' name with the much-discussed fii 
percent adjustment figure, not four percent. 
7. The CSRB administrator's December 3, 1991 ruling stated the following pertinent reasoning for denying tl 
Department's resurrected claim of untimeliness by Grievant: 
The Administrator of the Career Service Review Board holds that the issue 
of timeliness is moot because the department head waived the issue of 
untimeliness raised by the Department's administrative law judge (ALI) in the 
latter's Recommended Decision [Phase I]. The department head, 
Commissioner D. Douglas Bodrero, remanded \gent Jones' grievance to the 
Department's ALJ for further proceedings on the record at the Step 4 level 
for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the grievance. Subsequently, the 
Department's ALI issued a second determination on Agent Jones' grievance. 
The Step 4 proceeding and decision dealt with the grievance's merits, 
following which the department head issued a decision on the merits of the 
grievance. Hence, since the department head waived the issue of any alleged 
untimeliness, there is no such issue before the Administrator to review. As the 
department head knowingly and deliberately waived the issue of timeliness at 
Step 4, to now have the Department representative attempt to raise that issue 
again or anew may suggest bad faith in dealing with this grievance. 
In my opinion, the grievance is justiciable at Step 5 before the Board's 
appointed hearing officer; therefore, the request is denied. 
8. The Department produced no showing of evidence to substantiate its claim that a five percent pay adjustmen 
to Agent Jones would somehow create internal salary problems with the other seven trooper/agents oi 
other identified UHP troopers. Certainly no salary data was submitted on this point. 
. 1 Q . 
9. At various times during the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing the Department explained that a trooper who accepted 
a special assignment, thereby receiving a special pay adjustment, received "sergeant's wages." (T. 48, 63,69, and 
83-84.) This term seems misleading. For example, a Highway Patrol Trooper I is classified at Grade 19; a 
UHP Trooper II is paid at Grade 21 level; and a UHP Sergeant is classified at pay Grade 25. Each grade level 
(also called a salary range per R468-1-1) has an entry rate, a midpoint rate, and a maximum rate; and beyond 
the latter one may advance in pay only through meeting longevity criteria in order to exceed the maximum rate 
on a given grade/range. During the period of years in which the Slate has been using this open range system 
for the Classified Pay Plan, employees' individual pay rates may vary anywhere on a given salary range from the 
entry point to the maximum rate, or beyond for longevity. Hence it is an erroneous figure of speech to speak 
in terms of troopers receiving "sergeant's wages." Troopers arc either on Grade 19 or 21 (Grade 23 is not 
presently being used), while sergeants are on the higher Grade 25 level. (See, for example, Grvt. Exh. 1, 2; 
Agency Exh. 4, 5.) 
A trooper with many more years of service may be earning more pay by being further along the 
trooper's salary range (Grade 19 or 21) than a newer sergeant who has less years with the UHP. Literally, it 
is a misnomer, then, to speak in terms of a trooper earning "sergeant's wages." At best, this simply means that 
a trooper is receiving a temporary salary increase for appointment to a special assignment, not that the trooper 
is on the grade/range of sergeants at Grade 25. Importantly, even the Department's own personnel expert 
(Rac Callin) did not know whether Jones was being paid extra as the Auto Theft Coordinator because he was 
doing the duties of a sergeant (including supervision), or because he warranted extra pay for occupying that 
position as a special assignment (T. 65). The hearing officer observed that even though Grievant continued to 
receive his August 4, 1984 special pay adjustment (i. c., so-called "sergeant's wages") while serving in the 
Coordinator position, he appears to have done so in a nonsupcrvisory capacity (Step 5 Conclusion number 9). 
Some confusion is also manifest in this grievance by the Department's suggesting that if Grievant were 
to receive the same five percent awarded to the other seven selected troopers/agents that such a situation would 
create a pay inequity problem between Jones and the other seven troopers. This is a specious argument which 
attempts to blanket the Department's previous error in not restoring Jones' salary when his special assignments 
ended in 1988. As a Trooper II with 17 years' UHP experience, Jones is quite likely to have a salary rate in 
excess of most troopers more recently hired than himself. Also, it matters not that Jones' pay rate is below, at, 
or above the pay rate of a particular trooper, sergeant, lieutenant, or captain. What matters is whether Jones 
is being paid properly on his assigned grade/rangc-cither at a Grade 21 pay rate as a Trooper II or at Grade 23 
pay rate for a Law Enforcement Agent I, depending on which level he is classified according to his assigned 
duties at a given time. Comparison with the same or other job titles and other salary histories on other 
grades/ranges is not the proper comparison. Jones needs to be given proper credit for his length of service, his 
prior promotions, his prior merit/productivity increases, and any other variables directly affecting his particular 
pay rate as presently classified. 
The State expects that merit and achievement will determine the advancement of its employees, and 
that employees will be properly rewarded with a salary and benefits that encourages excellence amidst a fair 
employment system (§67-19-2(3)). To hold Jones unfairly to his Grade 21 Trooper II pay rate while 
concomitantly placing him at the duties and responsibilities of a Grade 23, when the other seven troopers 
received a five percent increase for their advancement to Grade 23 but which he did not, is not an acceptable 
merit system practice. Such unfairness and disparate treatment require redress for Agent Jones. 
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